This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2011-02-09 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In Chung Ka Bio v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[39] this Court resolved in the negative the issue of whether private individuals can file with the SEC petitions for declaration in a state of suspension of payments. We held that Sec. 5(d) of PD 902-A clearly does not allow a mere individual to file the petition, which is limited to "corporations, partnerships or associations." Besides, We pointed out that the SEC, being a mere administrative agency, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and, as such, can only exercise those powers, which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. We, thus, concluded that where no authority is granted to hear petitions of individuals for suspension of payments, such petitions are beyond the competence of the SEC. In short, the SEC has no jurisdiction over private individuals relative to any petition for suspension of payments, whether the private individual is a petitioner or a co-petitioner. We have said time and again that the SEC's "jurisdiction is limited only to corporations and corporate assets;" it has no jurisdiction over the properties of private individuals or natural persons, even if they are the corporation's officers or sureties.[40] We have, thus, consistently applied this ruling to the subsequent Ong v. Philippine Commercial International Bank,[41] Modern Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[42] and Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals.[43] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Clearly, Asianbank's right to collect payment for the full amount from Geronimo, as surety, exists independently of its right against Gateway as principal debtor;[13] it could thus proceed against one of them or file separate actions against them to recover the principal debt covered by the deed on suretyship, subject to the rule prohibiting double recovery from the same cause.[14] This legal postulate becomes all the more cogent in case of an insolvency situation where, as here, the insolvency court is bereft of jurisdiction over the sureties of the principal debtor. As Asianbank aptly points out, a suit against the surety, insofar as the surety's solidary liability is concerned, is not affected by an insolvency proceeding instituted by or against the principal debtor. The same principle holds true with respect to the surety of a corporation in distress which is subject of a rehabilitation proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As we held in Commercial Banking Corporation v. CA, a surety of the distressed corporation can be sued separately to enforce his liability as such, notwithstanding an SEC order declaring the former under a state of suspension of payment.[15] | |||||