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DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD v. JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

2014-02-04
PERALTA, J.
existence of appellate jurisdiction.[20] Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC,[21] Garcia v. De Jesus,[22] Veloria v. COMELEC,[23] Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,[24] and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,[25] this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power.[26] It must be observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,[27] these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249[28] now provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
2012-09-24
BRION, J.
While the very nature of an administrative agency and the raison d'être for its creation[103] and proliferation dictate a grant of quasi-judicial power to it, the matters over which it may exercise this power must find sufficient anchorage on its enabling law, either by express provision or by necessary implication. Once found, the quasi-judicial power partakes of the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, to hear and determine a class of cases within its peculiar competence and expertise. In other words, the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency.[104]
2010-06-29
NACHURA, J.
The DARAB assumed jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari by virtue of Section 3,[15] Rule VIII of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, which allows the filing of such petition to assail an interlocutory order of the Provincial Adjudicator. However, a month after the DARAB rendered its decision, the Court, in DARAB v. Lubrica,[16] declared that such apparent grant of authority to issue a writ of certiorari is not founded on any law. It declared that neither the DARAB's quasi-judicial authority nor its rule-making power justifies the self-conferment of authority.[17]  Thus, the Court concluded that the DARAB has no certiorari jurisdiction: In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DAR's competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.[18]
2008-07-31
NACHURA, J.
On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period. This conclusion, as already explained in the assailed decision, is based on the doctrines laid down in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals[8] and Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica.[9]
2007-08-14
NACHURA, J.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals[27] and in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,[28] we explained the consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.
2006-07-21
CARPIO, J.
The 1987 Constitution has established three branches of government - the Executive, Legislative and Judicial. In addition, there are the independent constitutional bodies - like the Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission, and the Ombudsman. Then there are the hybrid or quasi-judicial agencies,[37] exercising jurisdiction in specialized areas, that are under the Executive branch for administrative supervision purposes, but whose decisions are reviewable by the courts. Lastly, there are the local government units, which under the Constitution enjoy local autonomy[38] subject only to limitations Congress may impose by law.[39] Local government units are subject to general supervision by the President.[40]