This case has been cited 5 times or more.
2012-08-29 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business.[43] Applying by analogy Article 2000,[44] Article 2001[45] and Article 2002[46] of the Civil Code (all of which concerned the hotelkeepers' degree of care and responsibility as to the personal effects of their guests), we hold that there is much greater reason to apply the same if not greater degree of care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests are involved. Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers have unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors of the guests, without being held liable should anything untoward· befall the unwary guests. That would be absurd, something that no good law would ever envision. In fine, the Court sees no reversible-error on the part of the CA. | |||||
2011-03-16 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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The urging of the accused that the Court should review her case due to the conflicting versions of the parties is unwarranted. The determination of which of the different versions was to be believed is fundamentally an issue of credibility whose resolution belonged to the domain of the trial judge who had observed the deportment and manner of the witnesses at the time of their testimony. [10] The Court naturally accords great respect to the trial judge's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, because the trial judge was in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies by reason of his unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. [11] With more reason do we hold so herein, for the CA, as the reviewing tribunal, affirmed the RTC, as the trial court. [12] The accused bore the ensuing obligation to demonstrate to our satisfaction that the CA had overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance that, if considered, would change the outcome. Alas, she did not do so. | |||||
2007-11-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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The evidence is likewise clear that as a result of his injuries, [Mario] Candaliza was not able to leave for abroad and thus lost an opportunity to earn U.S. $875.00 a month plus guaranteed two hours overtime every working day at U.S. $6.31 per hour (Exhs. "B," "B-3," "E" & "F"; tsn, 11-10-87, pp. 39-40). However, expenses for [Mario] Candaliza's hospitalization were paid for by his employer, Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. (tsn, 11-10-97, p. 37).[32] We see no reason to annul or modify the amount of actual or compensatory damages awarded to Mario. The same was based on facts and law. We recognize that it is within the domain of lower courts to determine the proper amount of damages that may be awarded, and such determination binds this Court especially if sufficiently supported by evidence and not unconscionable or excessive.[33] | |||||
2007-02-14 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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However, we find the award of P500,000.00 in moral damages and P500,000.00 in exemplary damages to be excessive. Moral damages and exemplary damages are not intended to enrich the complainant in order to punish the defendant.[31] Moral damages are for reparation of the spiritual status quo ante; a means to assuage the moral suffering of the complainant brought about by the culpable action of the defendant. The award of moral damages must then be commensurate to the suffering or proportionate to the wrong committed.[32] An award of P100,000.00 approximates the anxiety suffered by Victoria. | |||||
2005-08-11 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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We find, however, that the trial court erred in awarding to respondent moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P300,000.00 and attorney's fee in the amount of P50,000.00. These amounts are quite excessive. We have held that although the trial court is given the discretion to determine the amount of such damages, the appellate court may modify or change the amount awarded when it is inordinate,[9] as in this case. |