This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2011-02-22 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct[10] which mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In line with jurisprudence, Judge Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide a case within the reglementary period.[11] | |||||
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2008-11-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Judge Doyon's claim that the administrative case was filed after his compulsory retirement also cannot free him from liability. In Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Lapu-Lapu City[50] and Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City,[51] audit investigations were conducted before the judges' compulsory retirements. However the cases were treated as administrative complaints only after the judges had compulsorily retired. The Court still held them liable for undue delay and imposed on them fines, which were deducted from their retirement benefits.[52] | |||||
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2008-01-30 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Clerks of court are essential judicial officers who perform delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice.[19] However, while an officer of the court, a public officer and an "officer of the law," the position of clerk of court is not that of a judicial officer, nor is it synonymous with the court. The office is essentially a ministerial one.[20] | |||||
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2007-11-20 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that cessation from office by reason of resignation,[12] death, or retirement[13] does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative case filed against a public officer while he or she was still in the service, or render the said case academic. The jurisdiction of the disciplining authority attaches at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint and is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. This rule applies to all employees in the civil service,[14] mindful of the constitutional precept that public office is a public trust for which all government employees and officials are accountable to the people. The rationale for this doctrine, as applied to government employees and officials in the judiciary, was explained in Perez v. Abiera[15] in this wise:[T]he jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For, what remedy would the people have against a civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. The retirement of petitioner effective January 1, 1998, did not render moot the instant case. The filing of the administrative complaint against petitioner on December 17, 1997, prior to his retirement, effectively conferred upon the NPC, the CSC, and this Court, the jurisdiction to resolve the case until its conclusion. Hence, the guilt or innocence of petitioner can be validly addressed by the Court in the instant administrative case. | |||||
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2006-11-02 |
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| Delay reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly. We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge, especially at a time when clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary, whose present leadership has launched an all out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases.[17] | |||||
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2006-04-26 |
CORONA, J. |
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| It is not uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in meritorious cases, to grant judges of lower courts additional time to decide cases beyond the three-month period. All that a judge should do, in cases of great difficulty, is to request an extension of time. To this, the Court has, almost invariably, been sympathetic.[29] Respondent judge fell short of expectations in this regard. | |||||
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2006-01-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| By his failures, respondent violated Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. They equally demonstrate his lack of dedication to his work. Respondent should be reminded that his assumption of judicial office casts upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his position. The court exists to promote justice and to attain this, a judge should organize his court with a view of prompt and convenient dispatch of business, be punctual in the performance of his duties, exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him and be prompt in disposing all matters submitted to him. [29] Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. [30] | |||||
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2005-11-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The Court, in its pursuit of speedy disposition of justice, is not unmindful of the circumstances that may justify the delay in the disposition of cases assigned to judges. It remains sympathetic to seasonably filed requests for extensions of time to decide cases.[11] It is not unusual for this Court, upon proper application and in meritorious cases, especially when difficult questions of law or complex issues are involved, to grant judges of lower courts additional time to decide beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is request for an extension of time over which the Court has, almost customarily, been considerate.[12] The respondent Judge did not avail of such remedy. | |||||