This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2009-06-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.[9] More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera,[10] the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.[11] The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,[12] where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman. | |||||
|
2007-08-10 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| Verily, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is but a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and is subject to his supervision and control. In Perez v. Sandiganbayan,[4] this Court held that control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." Clearly, in disapproving the recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to dismiss all the charges against petitioner and his co-accused, respondent Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion. | |||||
|
2005-04-12 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason.[62] In Alba v. Nitorreda,[63] we have held that:It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman, who beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.[64] | |||||
|
2005-01-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[18] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||