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GR No. 190846

2016-02-03

BRION, J.

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[38]

GR Nos. 204481-82

2015-10-14

ALBERT G. AMBAGAN v. PEOPLE

VELASCO JR., J.

Resolving the issues posed by the petitioner, as aptly pointed out by the OSP, indeed requires a review of the Sandiganbayan's findings of fact, which is generally not a function of this Court. The oft-quoted rule is that factual findings of the court a quo and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.[47] This rule, however, is not ironclad as it admits of exceptions[48] such as when the lower court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance,[49] which the Sandiganbayan, as will be discussed, committed in the case at bar.

GR No. 196249

2014-07-21

ROSE HANA ANGELES v. FERDINAND M. BUCAD

DEL CASTILLO, J.

What must be realized, however, is that this Court is not a trier of facts. "[T]he jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again."[26] This principle applies with greater force in labor cases, where this Court has consistently held that findings of fact of the NLRC are accorded great respect and even finality,[27] especially if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and are supported by substantial evidence.[28] "Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination."[29] Factual issues are beyond the scope of this Court's authority to review on certiorari.[30]

GR No. 185665

2012-02-08

EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES v. EASTERN TELECOMS EMPLOYEES UNION

MENDOZA, J.

As a general rule, in petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, not being a trier of facts, does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. The rule, however, admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court or the lower administrative body, as the case may be.[11] Considering the incongruent factual conclusions of the CA and the NLRC, this Court finds Itself obliged to resolve it.

GR No. 184850

2010-10-20

E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES v. SHEN DAR ELECTRICITY

VELASCO JR., J.

In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[24] the Court ruled that: We are very much aware that the rule to the effect that this Court is not a trier of facts admits of exceptions. As we have stated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA:

GR No. 170734

2008-05-14

ARCO METAL PRODUCTS v. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ARCO METAL-NAFLU

TINGA, J,

As a general rule, in petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, not being a trier of facts, does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.[10] The rule, however, admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to that of the lower tribunals. Such is the case here, as the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals differ from that of the voluntary arbitrator.

GR No. 172651

2007-10-02

UNITED OVERSEAS BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ROSEMOOR MINING

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Again, we do not agree. In controverting the basis relied upon by the Bulacan RTC in issuing the Injunction, Overseas Bank, in effect, wants this Court to calibrate the evidence presented before the lower court all over again, a task which we cannot do in consonance with the well-settled rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.[37]

GR NO. 167347

2007-01-31

CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA SA CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

CARPIO MORALES, J.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should raise only questions of law.[18] It is a settled rule that in the exercise of this Court's power of review, it does not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence presented, consistent with the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.[19] A fortiori, this rule applies in labor cases.[20] As long as the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies are supported by substantial evidence, they are entitled to great respect in light of their expertise in their respective fields.[21]

GR NO. 146174

2006-07-12

DR. DANILO T. TING v. CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases.[41] Thus, we do not, in this instant concern ourselves with the question of whether private respondent is a regular employee, the same having been unanimously settled in the proceedings a quo. It is beyond question that private respondent as a regular employee enjoys the protection of the Labor Code on security of tenure. As earlier stated, his termination must comply foremost with the substantive aspect prescribed by the law. Article 279[42] of the Labor Code makes it clear that, in cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by law. Hence, private respondent's dismissal must be based on just or authorized cause enumerated in the Labor Code.

GR NO. 152613 & NO. 152628

2006-06-23

APEX MINING CO. v. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The established rule is that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court not being a trier of facts, does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.[22] This rule, however, admits of exceptions as recognized by jurisprudence, to wit: (1) [w]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[23] Also, in the case of Manila Electric Company v. Benamira,[24] the Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, deemed it proper to look deeper into the factual circumstances of the case since the Court of Appeal's findings are at odds to those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Just like in the foregoing case, it is this Court's considered view that a re-evaluation of the attendant facts surrounding the present case is appropriate considering that the findings of the MAB are in conflict with that of the Court of Appeals.

	GR No. 190846 2016-02-03	TOMAS P. TAN v. JOSE G. HOSANA BRION, J.
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[38]
	GR Nos. 204481-82 2015-10-14	ALBERT G. AMBAGAN v. PEOPLE VELASCO JR., J.
Resolving the issues posed by the petitioner, as aptly pointed out by the OSP, indeed requires a review of the Sandiganbayan's findings of fact, which is generally not a function of this Court. The oft-quoted rule is that factual findings of the court a quo and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.[47] This rule, however, is not ironclad as it admits of exceptions[48] such as when the lower court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance,[49] which the Sandiganbayan, as will be discussed, committed in the case at bar.
	GR No. 196249 2014-07-21	ROSE HANA ANGELES v. FERDINAND M. BUCAD DEL CASTILLO, J.
What must be realized, however, is that this Court is not a trier of facts. "[T]he jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again."[26] This principle applies with greater force in labor cases, where this Court has consistently held that findings of fact of the NLRC are accorded great respect and even finality,[27] especially if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and are supported by substantial evidence.[28] "Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination."[29] Factual issues are beyond the scope of this Court's authority to review on certiorari.[30]
	GR No. 185665 2012-02-08	EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES v. EASTERN TELECOMS EMPLOYEES UNION MENDOZA, J.
As a general rule, in petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, not being a trier of facts, does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. The rule, however, admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court or the lower administrative body, as the case may be.[11] Considering the incongruent factual conclusions of the CA and the NLRC, this Court finds Itself obliged to resolve it.
	GR No. 184850 2010-10-20	E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES v. SHEN DAR ELECTRICITY VELASCO JR., J.
In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[24] the Court ruled that: We are very much aware that the rule to the effect that this Court is not a trier of facts admits of exceptions. As we have stated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA:
	GR No. 170734 2008-05-14	ARCO METAL PRODUCTS v. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ARCO METAL-NAFLU TINGA, J,
As a general rule, in petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, not being a trier of facts, does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.[10] The rule, however, admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to that of the lower tribunals. Such is the case here, as the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals differ from that of the voluntary arbitrator.
	GR No. 172651 2007-10-02	UNITED OVERSEAS BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ROSEMOOR MINING CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Again, we do not agree. In controverting the basis relied upon by the Bulacan RTC in issuing the Injunction, Overseas Bank, in effect, wants this Court to calibrate the evidence presented before the lower court all over again, a task which we cannot do in consonance with the well-settled rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.[37]
	GR NO. 167347 2007-01-31	CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA SA CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION CARPIO MORALES, J.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should raise only questions of law.[18] It is a settled rule that in the exercise of this Court's power of review, it does not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence presented, consistent with the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.[19] A fortiori, this rule applies in labor cases.[20] As long as the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies are supported by substantial evidence, they are entitled to great respect in light of their expertise in their respective fields.[21]
	GR NO. 146174 2006-07-12	DR. DANILO T. TING v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases.[41] Thus, we do not, in this instant concern ourselves with the question of whether private respondent is a regular employee, the same having been unanimously settled in the proceedings a quo. It is beyond question that private respondent as a regular employee enjoys the protection of the Labor Code on security of tenure. As earlier stated, his termination must comply foremost with the substantive aspect prescribed by the law. Article 279[42] of the Labor Code makes it clear that, in cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by law. Hence, private respondent's dismissal must be based on just or authorized cause enumerated in the Labor Code.
	GR NO. 152613 & NO. 152628 2006-06-23	APEX MINING CO. v. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The established rule is that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court not being a trier of facts, does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.[22] This rule, however, admits of exceptions as recognized by jurisprudence, to wit: (1) [w]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[23] Also, in the case of Manila Electric Company v. Benamira,[24] the Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, deemed it proper to look deeper into the factual circumstances of the case since the Court of Appeal's findings are at odds to those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Just like in the foregoing case, it is this Court's considered view that a re-evaluation of the attendant facts surrounding the present case is appropriate considering that the findings of the MAB are in conflict with that of the Court of Appeals.

NEW CITY BUILDERS v. NLRC