This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2012-02-20 |
REYES, J. |
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| Preliminarily, with respect to the infirmity suffered by this petition from the standpoint of Rule 45, this Court agrees with the respondent that the issue of whether the respondent had presented sufficient proof of the required possession under a bona fide claim of ownership raises a question of fact, considering that it invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record.[8] However, that a petition for review should be confined to questions of law and that this Court is not a trier of facts and bound by the factual findings of the CA are not without exceptions. Among these exceptions, which obtain in this case, are: (a) when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts or (b) when its findings are not sustained by the evidence on record. | |||||
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2010-07-02 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| With respect to the setting of the initial hearing outside the 90-day period set forth under Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the Court agrees with the CA in ruling that the setting of the initial hearing is the duty of the land registration court and not the applicant. Citing Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,[5] this Court held in Republic v. San Lorenzo Development Corporation[6] that: The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which the party-applicant absolutely has no participation. x x x | |||||
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2007-06-01 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the review and revision of errors of law. The Court is not bound to analyze and weigh evidence already presented and considered in prior proceedings. Absent any of the established grounds for exception to this rule, the Court is compelled to accept the findings of fact of the trial and the appellate courts.[5] | |||||
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2006-07-31 |
PUNO, J. |
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| Petitioners, in this case, applied for registration of title to two parcels of land covered by Plan Psu-240345. Both parcels of land are located in San Juan, Taytay, Rizal, near the shore of Laguna de Bay. The controlling law in the instant case is Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. It governs what were used to be known as public agricultural lands, or what are otherwise known as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Under the Public Land Act, there is a presumption that the land applied for belongs to the state, and that the occupants and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession thereof[15] for a period prescribed by law. This principle is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, under which the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The basic doctrine is that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[16] Any applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title has the burden of proving, by incontrovertible evidence,[17] that the (a) land applied for is alienable and disposable public land; and, (b) the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land, in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[18] | |||||