This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2008-09-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Equally clear to us, there was no manifest abuse of discretion on the part of Director Palanca-Santiago for her refusal to inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. Even if a preliminary investigation resembles a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case,[49] public prosecutors could not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged.[50] They are not considered judges, by the nature of their functions, but merely quasi-judicial officers.[51] Worth-stressing, one adverse ruling by itself would not prove bias and prejudice against a party sufficient to disqualify even a judge.[52] Hence, absent proven allegations of specific conduct showing prejudice and hostility, we cannot impute grave abuse of discretion here on respondent director. To ask prosecutors to recuse themselves on reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in a case would cause unwarranted delays in the prosecution of actions. | |||||
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2006-09-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The marginal notes of Ombudsmen to the recommendations of investigating prosecutors are hardly internal matters. In Cruz, Jr. v. People,[28] Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan,[29] and Gallardo v. People,[30] the marginal notes, even one-liners as in the case of Gallardo, were judicially considered sufficient dispositions by the Ombudsmen and Special Prosecutors concerned. We held in Olivarez that:The mere fact that the order to file the information against petitioner was contained in a marginal note is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of respondent special prosecutors, absent a clear showing that they gravely abused their discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors to dismiss or withdraw the case against petitioner. x x x.[31] Was there, as petitioners assert, a violation of the orders of the Ombudsman as stated in his marginal note? | |||||
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2006-09-22 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an integral component of the Ombudsman and is under the latter's supervision and control. Thus, whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate. Generally, courts should not interfere in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman.[20] Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.[21] | |||||
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2006-02-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As to petitioner's remonstration on the manner the Ombudsman resolved the motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation by merely writing a marginal note, the same deserves scant consideration. The marginal note of the Ombudsman setting aside the recommendation of SPO Jurado and ordering the filing of the necessary informations against petitioner is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure on the part of the Ombudsman to appreciate the evidence presented. As held in Gallardo v. People[14]:x x x. It may appear that the Ombudsman's one-line note lacks any factual or evidentiary grounds as it did not set forth the same. The state of affairs, however, is that the Ombudsman's note stems from his review of the findings of fact reached by the investigating prosecutor. The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor's conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct an investigation anew. He is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation by the investigating prosecutor, i.e., whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of the latter. He may agree, fully or partly, or disagree completely with the investigating prosecutor. Whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate. x x x | |||||
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2005-11-18 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations.[45] To insulate the OMB from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution and RA 6770[46] (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) grant it a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers virtually free from executive, legislative or judicial intervention.[47] Such initiative and independence must be inherent in the ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of public service.[48] | |||||