This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-07-29 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Co[79] and Manaysay,[80] however, testified that Lara was at the scene of the crime during the early morning of August 10, 1998, which was shortly after they were abducted at 1:30 a.m. of the same day. We have repeatedly held that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[81] Ramirez's house, where he was fetched by Lara at 7:00 a.m. on August 10, 1998 is at Daang Bakal, Bagong Silang, Parang, Marikina - the very same area where the safehouse was located. It was certainly not physically impossible for Lara to have been at the scene of the crime at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998 and still be able to arrive, at Ramirez's house within the same vicinity at 7:00 a.m. Furthermore, on both August 10 and 11, Ramirez testified that he and Lara parted ways on Kaolin Street, which was the very same street Co and Manaysay ran to when they escaped from the safehouse.[82] | |||||
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2007-07-12 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| A His back. [10] Given appellant's positive identification by eyewitnesses Campita and Manatlao, both of whom had no motive to falsely testify against the former, appellant's defense of bare denial and alibi must simply collapse. His claim that during the time material he was at his cousin's house in Sitio Tabing Ilog and was having a drinking spree with his cousin Oscar and a certain Nonoy fails to impress. For alibi to prosper, appellant must show that he was at such place for such period of time that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission.[11] As admitted by appellant himself, Sitio Gumamela, where the incident happened, is only a 30-minute drive away from Sitio Tabing Ilog. Hence, it is not at all physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. We may add that neither his cousin Oscar nor Nonoy with whom he allegedly had a drinking spree was ever called upon by appellant to corroborate his tale. Already a weak defense, alibi becomes even weaker by reason of the failure of the defense to present any corroboration.[12] | |||||
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2006-09-27 |
TINGA, J. |
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| We should point out that the benefit of parole cannot be extended to Gardon even if he committed the crimes for which he is now convicted prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9346.[34] Sec. 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the law "shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life- imprisonment." Although the law makes no reference to persons convicted to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua such as Gardon, the Court has consistently held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law likewise does not apply to persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In People v. Enriquez,[35] we declared:[R]eclusion perpetua is the only penalty that can be imposed against the appellants. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, cannot be applied in the case of appellants considering the proscription in Sec. 2 thereof, viz: | |||||
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2006-08-31 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| SO ORDERED.[6] | |||||