Lawyerly

GR Nos. 212536-37

2014-08-27

VELASCO JR., J.

It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a later law, general in terms and not expressly repealing or amending a prior special law, will not ordinarily affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.[9] So it must be here.

GR No. 175356

2013-12-03

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."[11] In support of their position, petitioners cite Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[12] where it was ruled that the 20% discount privilege constitutes taking of private property for public use which requires the payment of just compensation,[13] and Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[14] where it was acknowledged that the tax deduction scheme does not meet the definition of just compensation.[15]

GR No. 164050

2011-07-20

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. CIR

PEREZ, J.

It is worthy to mention that Republic Act No. 7432 had undergone two (2) amendments; first in 2003 by Republic Act No. 9257 and most recently in 2010 by Republic Act No. 9994. The 20% sales discount granted by establishments to qualified senior citizens is now treated as tax deduction and not as tax credit. As we have likewise declared in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[19] this case covers the taxable years 1993 and 1994, thus, Republic Act No. 7432 applies.

GR No. 180066

2009-07-07

CIR v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Between Presidential Decree No. 1520, on one hand, which is a special law specifically governing the franchise of PAL, issued on 11 June 1978; and the NIRC of 1997, on the other, which is a general law on national internal revenue taxes, that took effect on 1 January 1998, the former prevails. The rule is that on a specific matter, the special law shall prevail over the general law, which shall be resorted to only to supply deficiencies in the former. In addition, where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general - the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special - the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.[25]

GR Nos. 167274-75

2008-07-21

CIR v. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION

TINGA, J,

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[16] the tax authorities gave the term "tax credit" in Sections 2(i) and 4 of Revenue Regulation 2-94 a meaning utterly disparate from what R.A. No. 7432 provides. Their interpretation muddled up the intent of Congress to grant a mere discount privilege and not a sales discount. The Court, striking down the revenue regulation, held that an administrative agency issuing regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers, and it cannot engraft additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature. The Court emphasized that tax administrators are not allowed to expand or contract the legislative mandate and that the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction should be applied such that where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

GR No. 159610

2008-06-12

CIR v. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION

CARPIO, J.

The issues presented are not novel. In two similar cases involving the same parties where respondent lodged its claim for tax credit on the senior citizens' discount granted in 1995[22] and 1996,[23] this Court has squarely ruled that the 20% senior citizens' discount required by RA 7432 may be claimed as a tax credit and not merely a tax deduction from gross sales or gross income. Under RA 7432, Congress granted the tax credit benefit to all covered establishments without conditions. The net loss incurred in a taxable year does not preclude the grant of tax credit because by its nature, the tax credit may still be deducted from a future, not a present, tax liability. However, the senior citizens' discount granted as a tax credit cannot be refunded.

GR No. 151413

2008-02-13

CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION v. CIR

VELASCO JR., J.

This issue is not new, as the Court has resolved several cases involving the very same issue. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation (Central Luzon),[16] we held that private drug companies are entitled to a tax credit for the 20% sales discounts they granted to qualified senior citizens under RA 7432 and nullified Secs. 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94. In Bicolandia Drug Corporation (formerly Elmas Drug Corporation) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[17] we ruled that petitioner therein is entitled to a tax credit of the "cost" or the full 20% sales discounts it granted pursuant to RA 7432. In the related case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bicolandia Drug Corporation,[18] we likewise ruled that respondent drug company was entitled to a tax credit, and we struck down RR 2-94 to be null and void for failing to conform with the law it sought to implement.

GR NO. 166494

2007-06-29

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE

AZCUNA, J.

Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law[15] to reduce the income prior to the application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due.[16] Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed.

GR NO. 158253

2007-03-02

REPUBLIC v. CARLITO LACAP

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.[40] This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.[41] Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[42]

GR NO. 168550

2006-08-10

URBANO M. MORENO

TINGA, J.

On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.[17]

GR NO. 148083

2006-07-21

CIR v. BICOLANDIA DRUG CORPORATION

VELASCO, JR., J.

It cannot be denied that R.A. No. 7432 has a laudable goal. Moreover, it cannot be argued that it was the intent of lawmakers for private establishments to be the primary beneficiaries of the law. However, while the purpose of the law to benefit senior citizens is praiseworthy, the concerns of the affected private establishments were also considered by the lawmakers. As in other cases wherein private property is taken by the State for public use, there must be just compensation. In this particular case, it took the form of the tax credit granted to private establishments, purposely chosen by the lawmakers. In the similar case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[20] scrutinizing the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting on Social Justice on February 5, 1992 which finalized R.A. No. 7432, the discussions of the lawmakers clearly showed the intent that the cost of the 20 percent discount may be claimed by the private establishments as a tax credit. An excerpt from the deliberations is as follows: SEN. ANGARA. In the case of private hospitals they got the grant of 15% discount, provided that, the private hospitals can claim the expense as a tax credit

GR NO. 148512

2006-06-26

CIR v. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION

AZCUNA, J.

As earlier mentioned, the tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned.[12]

GR NO. 142299

2006-06-22

BICOLANDIA DRUG CORPORATION v. CIR

AZCUNA, J.

a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost[8] as tax credit. The term "cost" in the above provision refers to the amount of the 20% discount extended by a private establishment to senior citizens in their purchase of medicines. This amount shall be applied as a tax credit, and may be deducted from the tax liability of the entity concerned. If there is no current tax due or the establishment reports a net loss for the period, the credit may be carried over to the succeeding taxable year. This is in line with the interpretation of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation[9] wherein it affirmed that R.A. No. 7432 allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the amount of discounts they grant to senior citizens.

	GR Nos. 212536-37 2014-08-27	CIR v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES VELASCO JR., J.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a later law, general in terms and not expressly repealing or amending a prior special law, will not ordinarily affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.[9] So it must be here.
	GR No. 175356 2013-12-03	MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE DEL CASTILLO, J.
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."[11] In support of their position, petitioners cite Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[12] where it was ruled that the 20% discount privilege constitutes taking of private property for public use which requires the payment of just compensation,[13] and Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[14] where it was acknowledged that the tax deduction scheme does not meet the definition of just compensation.[15]
	GR No. 164050 2011-07-20	MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. CIR PEREZ, J.
It is worthy to mention that Republic Act No. 7432 had undergone two (2) amendments; first in 2003 by Republic Act No. 9257 and most recently in 2010 by Republic Act No. 9994. The 20% sales discount granted by establishments to qualified senior citizens is now treated as tax deduction and not as tax credit. As we have likewise declared in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[19] this case covers the taxable years 1993 and 1994, thus, Republic Act No. 7432 applies.
	GR No. 180066 2009-07-07	CIR v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Between Presidential Decree No. 1520, on one hand, which is a special law specifically governing the franchise of PAL, issued on 11 June 1978; and the NIRC of 1997, on the other, which is a general law on national internal revenue taxes, that took effect on 1 January 1998, the former prevails. The rule is that on a specific matter, the special law shall prevail over the general law, which shall be resorted to only to supply deficiencies in the former. In addition, where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general - the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special - the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.[25]
	GR Nos. 167274-75 2008-07-21	CIR v. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION TINGA, J,
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[16] the tax authorities gave the term "tax credit" in Sections 2(i) and 4 of Revenue Regulation 2-94 a meaning utterly disparate from what R.A. No. 7432 provides. Their interpretation muddled up the intent of Congress to grant a mere discount privilege and not a sales discount. The Court, striking down the revenue regulation, held that an administrative agency issuing regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers, and it cannot engraft additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature. The Court emphasized that tax administrators are not allowed to expand or contract the legislative mandate and that the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction should be applied such that where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
	GR No. 159610 2008-06-12	CIR v. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION CARPIO, J.
The issues presented are not novel. In two similar cases involving the same parties where respondent lodged its claim for tax credit on the senior citizens' discount granted in 1995[22] and 1996,[23] this Court has squarely ruled that the 20% senior citizens' discount required by RA 7432 may be claimed as a tax credit and not merely a tax deduction from gross sales or gross income. Under RA 7432, Congress granted the tax credit benefit to all covered establishments without conditions. The net loss incurred in a taxable year does not preclude the grant of tax credit because by its nature, the tax credit may still be deducted from a future, not a present, tax liability. However, the senior citizens' discount granted as a tax credit cannot be refunded.
	GR No. 151413 2008-02-13	CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION v. CIR VELASCO JR., J.
This issue is not new, as the Court has resolved several cases involving the very same issue. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation (Central Luzon),[16] we held that private drug companies are entitled to a tax credit for the 20% sales discounts they granted to qualified senior citizens under RA 7432 and nullified Secs. 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94. In Bicolandia Drug Corporation (formerly Elmas Drug Corporation) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[17] we ruled that petitioner therein is entitled to a tax credit of the "cost" or the full 20% sales discounts it granted pursuant to RA 7432. In the related case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bicolandia Drug Corporation,[18] we likewise ruled that respondent drug company was entitled to a tax credit, and we struck down RR 2-94 to be null and void for failing to conform with the law it sought to implement.
	GR NO. 166494 2007-06-29	CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AZCUNA, J.
Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law[15] to reduce the income prior to the application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due.[16] Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed.
	GR NO. 158253 2007-03-02	REPUBLIC v. CARLITO LACAP AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.[40] This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.[41] Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[42]
	GR NO. 168550 2006-08-10	URBANO M. MORENO TINGA, J.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.[17]
	GR NO. 148083 2006-07-21	CIR v. BICOLANDIA DRUG CORPORATION VELASCO, JR., J.
It cannot be denied that R.A. No. 7432 has a laudable goal. Moreover, it cannot be argued that it was the intent of lawmakers for private establishments to be the primary beneficiaries of the law. However, while the purpose of the law to benefit senior citizens is praiseworthy, the concerns of the affected private establishments were also considered by the lawmakers. As in other cases wherein private property is taken by the State for public use, there must be just compensation. In this particular case, it took the form of the tax credit granted to private establishments, purposely chosen by the lawmakers. In the similar case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[20] scrutinizing the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting on Social Justice on February 5, 1992 which finalized R.A. No. 7432, the discussions of the lawmakers clearly showed the intent that the cost of the 20 percent discount may be claimed by the private establishments as a tax credit. An excerpt from the deliberations is as follows: SEN. ANGARA. In the case of private hospitals they got the grant of 15% discount, provided that, the private hospitals can claim the expense as a tax credit
	GR NO. 148512 2006-06-26	CIR v. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION AZCUNA, J.
As earlier mentioned, the tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned.[12]
	GR NO. 142299 2006-06-22	BICOLANDIA DRUG CORPORATION v. CIR AZCUNA, J.
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost[8] as tax credit. The term "cost" in the above provision refers to the amount of the 20% discount extended by a private establishment to senior citizens in their purchase of medicines. This amount shall be applied as a tax credit, and may be deducted from the tax liability of the entity concerned. If there is no current tax due or the establishment reports a net loss for the period, the credit may be carried over to the succeeding taxable year. This is in line with the interpretation of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation[9] wherein it affirmed that R.A. No. 7432 allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the amount of discounts they grant to senior citizens.