This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2009-09-03 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[25] despite the denial of De Guzman's motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner's evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all.[26] Also in Astorga v. People,[27] on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,[28] by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondent's second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision. | |||||
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2009-08-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.[58] In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court Appeals,[59] we acknowledged the power of local government units to adopt zoning ordinances. Discretion is vested in the appropriate government agencies to determine the suitability of a land for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes.[60] It is also a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity.[61] Having the power to classify lands, the local government unit may consider factors that are just, reasonable and legal, for it is within the local government unit's power to determine these. However, if they abuse their authority in the performance of this duty, the courts, if prompted, can step in. | |||||
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2008-08-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in the theory by petitioner Quasha Law Office. Consistent with discussions in the preceding paragraphs, Quasha Law Office initially asserted itself as co-administrator of the estate before the courts. The records do not belie this fact. Petitioner Quasha Law Office later on denied it was substituted in the place of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate only upon filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, and then again before this Court. As a general rule, a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal.[26] When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[27] Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage.[28] | |||||
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2007-04-24 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Lastly, we note that petitioner is raising the issue of prescription for the first time in the instant motion for reconsideration. Although the same was raised in the petition for review, it was dismissed for late filing. No motion for reconsideration was filed hence the disputed assessment became final, demandable and executory. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for relief from judgment. However, it failed to raise the issue of prescription therein. After its petition for relief from judgment was denied by the Court of Tax Appeals for lack of merit, petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court without raising the issue of prescription. It is only in the instant motion for reconsideration that petitioner raised the issue of prescription which is not allowed. The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,[8] much more in a motion for reconsideration as in this case, because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[9] This last ditch effort to shift to a new theory and raise a new matter in the hope of a favorable result is a pernicious practice that has consistently been rejected. | |||||
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2007-03-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief from it. Worse, petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case by presenting their own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction.[17] It is also well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[18] Hence, herein petitioners can no longer raise the defense of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal of the complaint filed by the respondents Spouses Lumbao, because they already waived the said defense when they failed to file a Motion to Dismiss. | |||||
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2006-09-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,[19] where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the contentious property therein is agricultural in nature on the ground that the same had been classified as "park" since 1979 under the Zoning Ordinance of Cabuyao, as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB. Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the municipality into residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and districts and parks for open spaces. It did not convert, however, existing agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a municipal park, as shown in its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that an ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light industrial should be given prospective application only, and should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such land. x x x. | |||||
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2005-12-15 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As for the motion of the Ponce Group for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, dated 17 November 1994, after the denial of their first motion for reconsideration, the same had been appropriately denied by this Court. Section 2, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution shall be entertained;[80] thus, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Indeed, this Court does not discount instances when it may authorize the suspension of the rules of procedure so as to allow the resolution of a second motion for reconsideration,[81] but such authority may only be granted for extraordinarily persuasive reasons.[82] Unfortunately for the Ponce Group, this Court did not deem it appropriate to suspend the rules of procedure for their sake and disallowed the filing of their second motion for reconsideration. | |||||
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2005-09-26 |
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| In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,[25] this Court held that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider evidence in a petition for certiorari or petition for review on certiorari outside those submitted before the DARAB. Likewise, we cannot consider new issues raised at this very late stage in the proceedings as this would violate the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[26] | |||||