This case has been cited 15 times or more.
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2015-08-05 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The trial court scheduled the hearing for marking of exhibits on April 12, 2005.[15] Rosendo A. Bautista testified and identified the documents submitted with the application for registration.[16] He alleged that all records showing La Tondeña's purchase of the land from one Pablo Rimorin were burned, thus, applicant can only present tax declarations in its name for years 1948, 1953, 1964, 1974, 1980, 1985, 1994, and 1999.[17] | |||||
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2013-09-03 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),[4] the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco's possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan's period of possession. | |||||
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2009-09-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree vary, however, with respect to their operation since the latter operates when there exists a title which only needs confirmation, while the former works under the presumption that the land applied for still belongs to the State.[40] | |||||
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2009-06-30 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The Republic contends that subject Lot No. 3946 was certified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain only on May 16, 1993. Relying on Republic v. Herbieto,[13] it argues that prior to said date, the subject lot remained to be of the public dominion or res publicae in nature incapable of private appropriation, and, consequently, INC and its predecessors-in-interest's possession and occupation cannot confer ownership or possessory rights and "any period of possession prior to the date when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded in the computation of the period of possession."[14] | |||||
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2009-04-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9] | |||||
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2009-04-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982."[7] | |||||
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2009-04-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession..." That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. | |||||
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2008-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode.[40] Since the spouses Tan filed their application before the RTC, then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the subject property. | |||||
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2008-11-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This Court cannot countenance such a presumption for two reasons: First, it goes against the Regalian doctrine which states that all lands of whatever classification belong to the State. The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless the contrary is shown, are presumed to be public lands.[49] Second, without a definitive date when the subject lot became alienable and disposable, the determination of whether petitioners possessed the subject lot for the time period required by law is rendered impossible, since any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Such possession can never ripen into ownership; and unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[50] | |||||
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2008-10-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is true that petitioner was able to present testimonial evidence that his predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land prior to 12 June 1945 or even earlier. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that also by petitioner's own evidence, particularly, the Certification dated 5 February 2002 issued by the Urban Forestry and Law Enforcement Unit of the DENR-NCR, it has been established that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 3 January 1968 by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141. It is already settled that any period of possession prior to the date when the subject property was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[51] | |||||
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2008-08-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As can be gleaned from the records, respondent's possession of the subject property started only in the year 1979 when her mother executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in her favor. There was also no showing that her predecessors-in-interest had already been in possession or had already exercised acts of ownership over the subject property since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, as her predecessors-in-interest declared the subject property for taxation purposes only in the year 1948. What was clearly established by the respondent was possession of the subject property by her predecessors-in-interest beginning 1948, which was short of three years from 12 June 1945. What is more telling is that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982. Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1982, any occupation or possession thereof could not be considered in the counting of the 30-year possession requirement.[38] The period of possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be considered to have started in 1979, when the same was conveyed to her by her mother. Neither can her possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her predecessors-in-interest, even if they had occupied and were in possession of the same since 1948, because during those periods, the subject property had not yet been classified as alienable and disposable land capable of private appropriation. Possession of the subject property could only start to ripen into ownership on 15 March 1982, when the same became alienable and disposable. Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and, unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[39] The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition.[40] Possession of the land by the respondent under the circumstances, whether spanning decades or centuries, can never ripen into ownership.[41] | |||||
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2007-10-15 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[31] To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[32] The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.[33] | |||||
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2007-03-13 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[29] | |||||
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2007-03-02 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioners was not enough to prove that their possession of the subject property started since 12 June 1945 or earlier because the evidence established that the questioned parcel of land was acquired by petitioners' parents only on 30 January 1948, the date of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale by its previous owners. They can neither tack their possession to that of the previous owners because they failed to present any evidence of possession by those prior owners. Moreover, petitioners' possession of the subject property could only ripen into ownership on 3 January 1968, when the same became alienable and disposable. "Any period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto."[24] | |||||
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2006-07-31 |
PUNO, J. |
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| Petitioners, in this case, applied for registration of title to two parcels of land covered by Plan Psu-240345. Both parcels of land are located in San Juan, Taytay, Rizal, near the shore of Laguna de Bay. The controlling law in the instant case is Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. It governs what were used to be known as public agricultural lands, or what are otherwise known as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Under the Public Land Act, there is a presumption that the land applied for belongs to the state, and that the occupants and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession thereof[15] for a period prescribed by law. This principle is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, under which the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The basic doctrine is that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[16] Any applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title has the burden of proving, by incontrovertible evidence,[17] that the (a) land applied for is alienable and disposable public land; and, (b) the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land, in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[18] | |||||