This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2009-10-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Equally well-settled is the rule that the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order, while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing.[48] | |||||
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2007-11-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Oft-repeated is the rule that appellate courts accord the factual finding of the labor tribunal not only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence,[39] unless there is showing that the labor tribunal arbitrarily disregarded evidence before them or misapprehended evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.[40] Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and its absence is shown not by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the labor tribunal in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.[41] | |||||
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2007-11-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Finally, oft-repeated is the rule that appellate courts accord the factual findings of the labor tribunal not only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence,[14] unless there is showing that the labor tribunal arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or misapprehended evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.[15] Likewise, the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the labor tribunal in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.[16] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Given these circumstances, the quitclaims should be considered as binding on the private respondents who executed them. It is settled that a legitimate waiver which represents a voluntary and reasonable settlement of a worker's claim should be respected as the law between the parties.[44] Accordingly, the private respondents who made such quitclaims are already precluded from claiming reinstatement, backwages, ECOLA, 13TH month pay, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and other monetary claims. | |||||
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2007-04-23 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Given the foregoing circumstances, the "Receipt, Release, and Quitclaim" dated 15 August 1996 should be considered as legal and binding on petitioner. It is settled that a legitimate waiver which represents a voluntary and reasonable settlement of a worker's claim should be respected as the law between the parties.[53] Thus, the petitioner is bound by the "Receipt, Release and Quitclaim" dated 15 August 1996 and, as such, he is already precluded from assailing the validity of his dismissal. | |||||
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2006-06-27 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| While petitioner may be correct in stating that quitclaims are frowned upon for being contrary to public policy, the Court has, likewise, recognized legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of a worker's claim which should be respected as the law between the parties. Where the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking.[29] | |||||
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2006-01-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| It is settled rule that "the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing." [19] We expounded on the underlying reason behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco [20] where, reiterating the earlier pronouncements made in Contreras v. Felix, [21] we said:More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine, that the final judgment of the court as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, ... there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6). At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51). It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision. Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision." [22] While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations. [23] | |||||