This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-04-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In fact, in Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante,[6] we held that one of the ways to secure the discharge of an attachment is for the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on his behalf, to post a counterbond or make the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment.[7] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The Court is not convinced. The above article enunciates the rule that the obligation of a guarantor may be less, but cannot be more than the obligation of the principal debtor. The rule, however, cannot plausibly be stretched to mean that a guarantor or surety is freed from liability as such guarantor or surety in the event the principal debtor becomes insolvent or is unable to pay the obligation. This interpretation would defeat the very essence of a suretyship contract which, by definition, refers to an agreement whereunder one person, the surety, engages to be answerable for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another known as the principal.[16] Geronimo's position that a surety cannot be made to pay when the principal is unable to pay is clearly specious and must be rejected. | |||||
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2007-09-13 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| In Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante,[10] we reiterated the rule that while a contract of surety is secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the surety's liability to the creditor is said to be direct, primary, and absolute. In other words, the surety is directly and equally bound with the principal. Thus, Prudential is barred from disclaiming that its liability with J'Marc is solidary. | |||||