This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2013-06-17 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the ΒΌ portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.[8] This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.[9] | |||||
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2013-06-05 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive.[76] When the trial court issued its October 9, 2006 Order granting preliminary injunction on the transfer of the regional center to Koronadal City when such transfer was mandated by E.O. No. 304, the lower court did precisely that. | |||||
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2010-04-19 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| However, we will overlook this procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice. Although a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including the latter's mistakes and negligence, a departure from this rule is warranted where such mistake or neglect would result in serious injustice to the client.[29] Procedural rules may thus be relaxed for persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.[30] Such is the situation in this case. | |||||
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2009-08-04 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| To be sure, the foregoing doctrine can also be found in Landbank of the Philippines v. Josefina Dumlao et al[28] and Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform.[29] | |||||
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2009-03-13 |
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| As to the legal basis of just compensation, we hold that the applicable law is R.A. No. 6657. Our recent ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pacita Agricultural Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., etc., et al.[41] is enlightening. Therein, the Court made a comparative analysis of cases that confronted the issue of whether properties covered by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, for which the landowners had yet to be paid, would be compensated under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 or under the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657. We observed that in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines[42] - a case which LBP invokes in this controversy - the Court declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just compensation should be the time when the land was taken, i.e., in 1972, applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. However, the Court also noted that after Gabatin, the Court had decided several cases in which it found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at the time of payment. These cases are Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[43] Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform[44] and Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[45] including the earlier cases of Office of the President v. Court of Appeals[46] and Paris v. Alfeche.[47] | |||||
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2009-01-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[40] the Court applied its ruling in Natividad. The landowners in Meneses were likewise deprived of their property in 1972, which land has since been distributed and titles already distributed to farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228. However, up to the year 1993, no payment or rentals were made for the land. Thus, the landowners filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation. The trial court ruled that since the land was taken from the owners on 21 October 1972 under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, just compensation must be based on the value of the property at the time of taking. The appeal by the landowners to the Court of Appeals was dismissed. The landowners, thus, elevated the case to this Court. On the issue of the payment of just compensation, the Court adjudged:The Court also finds that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC ruling that just compensation in this case should be based on the value of the property at the time of taking, October 21, 1972, which is the effectivity date of P.D. No. 27. | |||||
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2008-11-27 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| In Natividad,[58] the Court ruled that the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time made it inequitable to follow the guidelines provided by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228. Hence, RA No. 6657 should apply. The same rationale was followed in Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform.[59] There, the Court noted that despite the lapse of more than thirty (30) years since the expropriation of the property in 1972, petitioners had yet to benefit from it, while the farmer-beneficiaries were already harvesting the property's produce. Thus, RA No. 6657 was applied instead of PD No. 27 in determining just compensation. | |||||