This case has been cited 5 times or more.
|
2010-07-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident to the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.[30] This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of.[31] Thus, in Magay v. Estiandan,[32] therein plaintiff-appellee filed an accion publiciana. In his defense, defendant-appellant alleged among others that plaintiff-appellee's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004 was issued under anomalous circumstances. When the case reached this Court, we rejected defendant-appellant's defense on the ground that the issue on the validity of said title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Also, in Co v. Court of Appeals[33] we arrived at the same conclusion and elaborated as follows: In their reply dated September 1990, petitioners argue that the issues of fraud and ownership raised in their so-called compulsory counterclaim partake of the nature of an independent complaint which they may pursue for the purpose of assailing the validity of the transfer certificate of title of private respondents. That theory will not prosper. | |||||
|
2009-08-14 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack.[20] A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.[21] This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of.[22] To permit a collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title.[23] | |||||
|
2009-07-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| It is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice. However, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random, to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. It must be emphasized that procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons.[32] | |||||
|
2007-03-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| The provisions of Supreme Court Circular Nos. 28-91 and 04-94 require a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in any initiatory pleading filed before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. In the case of Teoville Homeowner's Association v. Ferreira,[36] the Court emphatically underscored the need to show to the satisfaction of the Court that the person signing the verification and certification against non-forum shopping had been specifically authorized to do so. In other similar cases,[37] it has been ruled that it is the party-pleader, and not the counsel, who must execute the certificate against forum shopping. The rationale for the rule is that the counsel may be unaware of any similar actions pending with other courts on the same matter. In this case, Ferdinand Barles was no longer an officer of the union at the time this petition was filed, and therefore was no longer privy to the cases that may have been filed by MHEA. Absent the specific authorization from the MHEA members that he sought to represent, any statement he may make cannot bind the MHEA herein named. For the foregoing reasons alone, this petition should be dismissed. | |||||
|
2006-04-26 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| Petitioners question the validity of the rescission of the contract to sell and the consequent forfeiture of the payments made. The determination of this particular issue, however, calls for a review of facts which has already been passed upon by both the HLURB and the OP. Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by this Court because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.[25] | |||||