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GR No. 179334

2015-04-21

SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS v. SPS. HERACLEO AND RAMONA TECSON

PERALTA, J.

In effect, R.A. 8974 enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity.[47]

GR No. 194247

2013-06-19

BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ROSA REYES

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Records, however, show that the adjudged amount of just compensation was not arrived at judiciously since the RTC based the same solely on respondents' intimation that they were willing to settle for the rate of P3,000.00 per square meter.[46] It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just compensation can only be made after due ascertainment of the requirements set forth under RA 8974 and not merely based on the declarations of the parties.[47]

GR No. 189239

2010-11-24

SPS. LETICIA AND JOSE ERVIN ABAD v. FIL-HOMES REALTY

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the appellate court, citing Republic v. Gingoyon,[8] held the same does not signify the completion of the expropriation proceedings. Thus it disposed:

GR Nos. 154211-12

2009-06-22

SPS. ERNESTO F. CURATA AND LOURDES M. CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

VELASCO JR., J.

In Republic v. Gingoyon,[109] on the issue of how much must the government pay by way of initial deposit, the Court, after positing the applicability of RA 8974 to the expropriation of NAIA Passenger Terminal III (NAIA III), stated the observation that the appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of payment thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a procedural, matter.

GR No. 175983

2009-04-16

METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT v. J. KING

TINGA, J.

Further, the Court of Appeals ruled that Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 runs counter to the express mandate of Section 2 of Rule 67.[38] It held that the law undermined the principle that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. However, this Court has already settled the issue. In Republic v. Gingoyon,[39] this Court held that:It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of "immediate payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.

GR No. 175983

2009-04-16

METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT v. J. KING

TINGA, J.

R.A. No. 8974 provides a different scheme for the obtention of a writ of possession. The law does not require a deposit with a government bank; instead it requires the government to immediately pay the property owner.[42] The provisional character of this payment means that it is not yet final, yet, sufficient under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of possession over the expropriated property.[43] The provisional payment is a prerequisite[44] and a trigger[45] for the issuance of the writ of possession. In Gingoyon,[46] we held that: It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of "immediate payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.[47]

GR No. 169914

2009-04-07

ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In the meantime, PIATCO already began building the NAIA IPT III facilities. By the time this Court promulgated its Decision in Agan, disqualifying PIATCO as a bidder and annulling the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to it, the NAIA IPT III facilities were substantially complete. The Court, in its Resolution in Agan, recognized the right of PIATCO to just compensation for the NAIA IPT III facilities, in accordance with law and equity. The Government, thereafter, instituted an expropriation case for the determination of the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO. In Republic v. Gingoyon,[11] the Court affirmed the application of Republic Act No. 8974[12] to the expropriation case and the right of the Government to take possession of the NAIA IPT III facilities upon the payment to PIATCO of the proffered value of the same.

GR No. 166973

2009-02-10

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. BENJAMIN ONG CO

TINGA, J.

Petitioner expropriated respondent's property for its Lahar Project, a project for public use.[20] In Republic v. Gingoyon (Gingoyon), we observed that R.A. No. 8974 covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.[21] The Implementing Rules and Regulations[22] of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly include power generation, transmission and distribution projects among the national government projects covered by the law. There is no doubt that the installation of transmission lines is important to the continued growth of the country. Electricity moves our economy, it is a national concern. R.A. No. 8974 should govern the expropriation of respondent's property since the Lahar Project is a national government project.

GR No. 166973

2009-02-10

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. BENJAMIN ONG CO

TINGA, J.

It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the manner of payment thereof. At the same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides "all matters regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.[23]

GR Nos. 168578-79

2008-09-30

NIETO A. RACHO v. PRIMO C. MIRO

QUISUMBING, J.

Equally clear to us, there was no manifest abuse of discretion on the part of Director Palanca-Santiago for her refusal to inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. Even if a preliminary investigation resembles a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case,[49] public prosecutors could not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged.[50] They are not considered judges, by the nature of their functions, but merely quasi-judicial officers.[51] Worth-stressing, one adverse ruling by itself would not prove bias and prejudice against a party sufficient to disqualify even a judge.[52] Hence, absent proven allegations of specific conduct showing prejudice and hostility, we cannot impute grave abuse of discretion here on respondent director. To ask prosecutors to recuse themselves on reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in a case would cause unwarranted delays in the prosecution of actions.

GR No. 172410

2008-04-14

REPUBLIC v. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

At the outset, we call attention to a significant oversight in the TRB's line of reasoning. It failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon,[14] we held:There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.

GR NO. 158609

2007-07-27

SPS. MARIAN B. LINTAG AND ANGELO T. ARRASTIA v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

NACHURA, J.

In the case of Republic v. Gingoyon,[22] this Court held that RA No. 8974 is a substantive law, to wit: It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession. This ruling was reiterated in this Court's Resolution[23] of February 1, 2006, which further states that: [I]f the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural, and so the converse certainly holds that if the rule or provision creates a right, it should be properly appreciated as substantive in nature. Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it involves the creation of rights to be enjoyed by the owner of property to be expropriated. The right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right, appropriately classified as a substantive matter and, thus, within the sole province of the legislature to legislate on.

GR NO. 164195

2007-02-06

APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the state, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable.[58]

GR NO. 169453

2006-12-06

CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Moreover, there is nothing under Republic Act No. 8974 which can be read to allow an owner of the properties to be expropriated recourse to a "case to case" revaluation "when it disagrees with the zonal valuation by the BIR."[64] Resort to this procedure would undeniably cause delay in government infrastructure projects, and leave the determination of the provisional value of the expropriated properties to the property owner and the TCRPV, without the participation from the implementing expropriating agency. Such is contrary to R.A. 8974 which permits, in cases of utmost urgency and importance and when there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, an expedited means by which the government can immediately take possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation, by paying the property owner the implementing government agency's proffered value of the property.[65]

GR NO. 158895

2006-02-16

SPS. THELMA AND GREGORIO ABRAJANO v. HEIRS OF AUGUSTO F. SALAS

TINGA, J.

[32] Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005.

	GR No. 179334 2015-04-21	SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS v. SPS. HERACLEO AND RAMONA TECSON PERALTA, J.
In effect, R.A. 8974 enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity.[47]
	GR No. 194247 2013-06-19	BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ROSA REYES PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Records, however, show that the adjudged amount of just compensation was not arrived at judiciously since the RTC based the same solely on respondents' intimation that they were willing to settle for the rate of P3,000.00 per square meter.[46] It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just compensation can only be made after due ascertainment of the requirements set forth under RA 8974 and not merely based on the declarations of the parties.[47]
	GR No. 189239 2010-11-24	SPS. LETICIA AND JOSE ERVIN ABAD v. FIL-HOMES REALTY CARPIO MORALES, J.
Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the appellate court, citing Republic v. Gingoyon,[8] held the same does not signify the completion of the expropriation proceedings. Thus it disposed:
	GR Nos. 154211-12 2009-06-22	SPS. ERNESTO F. CURATA AND LOURDES M. CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VELASCO JR., J.
In Republic v. Gingoyon,[109] on the issue of how much must the government pay by way of initial deposit, the Court, after positing the applicability of RA 8974 to the expropriation of NAIA Passenger Terminal III (NAIA III), stated the observation that the appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of payment thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a procedural, matter.
	GR No. 175983 2009-04-16	METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT v. J. KING TINGA, J.
Further, the Court of Appeals ruled that Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 runs counter to the express mandate of Section 2 of Rule 67.[38] It held that the law undermined the principle that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. However, this Court has already settled the issue. In Republic v. Gingoyon,[39] this Court held that:It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of "immediate payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.
	GR No. 175983 2009-04-16	METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT v. J. KING TINGA, J.
R.A. No. 8974 provides a different scheme for the obtention of a writ of possession. The law does not require a deposit with a government bank; instead it requires the government to immediately pay the property owner.[42] The provisional character of this payment means that it is not yet final, yet, sufficient under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of possession over the expropriated property.[43] The provisional payment is a prerequisite[44] and a trigger[45] for the issuance of the writ of possession. In Gingoyon,[46] we held that: It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of "immediate payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.[47]
	GR No. 169914 2009-04-07	ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In the meantime, PIATCO already began building the NAIA IPT III facilities. By the time this Court promulgated its Decision in Agan, disqualifying PIATCO as a bidder and annulling the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to it, the NAIA IPT III facilities were substantially complete. The Court, in its Resolution in Agan, recognized the right of PIATCO to just compensation for the NAIA IPT III facilities, in accordance with law and equity. The Government, thereafter, instituted an expropriation case for the determination of the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO. In Republic v. Gingoyon,[11] the Court affirmed the application of Republic Act No. 8974[12] to the expropriation case and the right of the Government to take possession of the NAIA IPT III facilities upon the payment to PIATCO of the proffered value of the same.
	GR No. 166973 2009-02-10	NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. BENJAMIN ONG CO TINGA, J.
Petitioner expropriated respondent's property for its Lahar Project, a project for public use.[20] In Republic v. Gingoyon (Gingoyon), we observed that R.A. No. 8974 covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.[21] The Implementing Rules and Regulations[22] of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly include power generation, transmission and distribution projects among the national government projects covered by the law. There is no doubt that the installation of transmission lines is important to the continued growth of the country. Electricity moves our economy, it is a national concern. R.A. No. 8974 should govern the expropriation of respondent's property since the Lahar Project is a national government project.
	GR No. 166973 2009-02-10	NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. BENJAMIN ONG CO TINGA, J.
It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the manner of payment thereof. At the same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides "all matters regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.[23]
	GR Nos. 168578-79 2008-09-30	NIETO A. RACHO v. PRIMO C. MIRO QUISUMBING, J.
Equally clear to us, there was no manifest abuse of discretion on the part of Director Palanca-Santiago for her refusal to inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. Even if a preliminary investigation resembles a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case,[49] public prosecutors could not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged.[50] They are not considered judges, by the nature of their functions, but merely quasi-judicial officers.[51] Worth-stressing, one adverse ruling by itself would not prove bias and prejudice against a party sufficient to disqualify even a judge.[52] Hence, absent proven allegations of specific conduct showing prejudice and hostility, we cannot impute grave abuse of discretion here on respondent director. To ask prosecutors to recuse themselves on reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in a case would cause unwarranted delays in the prosecution of actions.
	GR No. 172410 2008-04-14	REPUBLIC v. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
At the outset, we call attention to a significant oversight in the TRB's line of reasoning. It failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon,[14] we held:There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
	GR NO. 158609 2007-07-27	SPS. MARIAN B. LINTAG AND ANGELO T. ARRASTIA v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION NACHURA, J.
In the case of Republic v. Gingoyon,[22] this Court held that RA No. 8974 is a substantive law, to wit: It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession. This ruling was reiterated in this Court's Resolution[23] of February 1, 2006, which further states that: [I]f the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural, and so the converse certainly holds that if the rule or provision creates a right, it should be properly appreciated as substantive in nature. Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it involves the creation of rights to be enjoyed by the owner of property to be expropriated. The right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right, appropriately classified as a substantive matter and, thus, within the sole province of the legislature to legislate on.
	GR NO. 164195 2007-02-06	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the state, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable.[58]
	GR NO. 169453 2006-12-06	CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY CARPIO MORALES, J.
Moreover, there is nothing under Republic Act No. 8974 which can be read to allow an owner of the properties to be expropriated recourse to a "case to case" revaluation "when it disagrees with the zonal valuation by the BIR."[64] Resort to this procedure would undeniably cause delay in government infrastructure projects, and leave the determination of the provisional value of the expropriated properties to the property owner and the TCRPV, without the participation from the implementing expropriating agency. Such is contrary to R.A. 8974 which permits, in cases of utmost urgency and importance and when there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, an expedited means by which the government can immediately take possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation, by paying the property owner the implementing government agency's proffered value of the property.[65]
	GR NO. 158895 2006-02-16	SPS. THELMA AND GREGORIO ABRAJANO v. HEIRS OF AUGUSTO F. SALAS TINGA, J.
[32] Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005.

REPUBLIC v. HENRICK F. GINGOYON