Lawyerly

GR No. 198753

2015-03-25

BERSAMIN, J.

We are appalled that the CA turned a blind eye to the egregious error of the RTC by limiting its attention to the supposedly patent defects and shortcomings of the petitioner's petition for review. The foremost noted defect was the non-payment of the docket fees, which, in other circumstances, would have alone warranted the outright rejection of the petition for review due to the mandatory and jurisdictional character of the payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period.[26] Such payment was the condition sine qua non for the perfection of the appeal by petition for review, and only by such payment could the CA have acquired jurisdiction over the appeal.[27] But the appeal of the conviction before the RTC had not yet been completed, and, as such, the petition for review of the petitioner was logically premature. In other words, it was plain to the CA that it could not validly act on the petition for review. To insist otherwise would be unjust against the petitioner, considering that the wrong turn in procedure that had generated the whole problem had been caused by the RTC.

GR No. 180064

2013-09-16

JOSE U. PUA v. CITIBANK

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that cases falling under Section 57 of the SRC, which pertain to civil liabilities arising from violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as well as other civil suits under Sections 56, 58, 59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought before the regional trial courts. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.[35] Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC provision of similar import is found in its sections governing criminal suits; quite the contrary, the SRC states that criminal cases arising from violations of its provisions should be first referred to the SEC.

GR No. 191660

2012-12-03

DELIA T. SUTTON v. ROMANITO P. LIM

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context particularly, that every part of the statute must be interpreted together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[22] Therefore, in line with the purpose of recognizing the right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners under the agrarian reform program, both paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 should be understood within the context of tenurial arrangements, else the intent of the law be subverted.

GR No. 187104

2010-08-03

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS

BRION, J.

The rulings in these cases have been consistently reiterated in subsequent cases: Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,[34] Pedrosa v. Spouses Hill,[35] Gegare v. Court of Appeals,[36] Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,[37] Sps. Manalili v. Sps. de Leon,[38] La Salette College v. Pilotin,[39] Saint Louis University v. Spouses Cordero,[40] M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva,[41] Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo,[42] Meatmasters Int'l. Corp. v. Lelis Integrated Dev't. Corp.,[43] Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr.,[44] Enriquez v. Enriquez,[45] KLT Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits, Inc.,[46] Tan v. Link,[47] Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Yap,[48] and most recently in Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO),[49] and continues to be the controlling doctrine.

GR No. 178989

2010-03-18

EAGLE RIDGE GOLF v. CA

VELASCO JR., J.

As with most rules of procedure, however, exceptions are invariably recognized and the relaxation of procedural rules on review has been effected to obviate jeopardizing substantial justice.[36] This liberality stresses the importance of review in our judicial grievance structure to accord every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[37] But concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[38]

AM No. 08-2-01-0

2010-02-11

RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

CORONA, J.

Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.[19] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.[20] Appellate docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period for taking an appeal.[21] Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.[22] Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[23]

GR No. 172574

2009-07-31

NOLI LIM v. ANGELITO DELOS SANTOS NOW HIS HEIRS

PUNO, C.J.

It is a well-established rule that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.[18] Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision or final order sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[19] The payment of docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.[20]

GR Nos. 154211-12

2009-06-22

SPS. ERNESTO F. CURATA AND LOURDES M. CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

VELASCO JR., J.

Among the grounds that pertinent jurisprudence has recognized as justifying the loosening up of the stringent requirement on payment of docket fees are: (1) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (2) good faith of the defaulting party by paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is frivolous and dilatory; (6) no unjust prejudice to the other party; and (7) importance of the issues involved. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[99]

GR No. 174219

2007-11-23

KLT FRUITS v. WSR FRUITS

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

It bears stressing that while we have laid down the rule on the discretionary interpretation of the rules on the perfection of an appeal or the payment of docket fees, we have also in some cases refused to give due course to an appeal for failure to pay docket fees. Thus, in Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr.,[27] petitioners therein failed to pay the docket fees on the ground that they were not advised by the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to when to pay the same. In affirming the dismissal of therein petitioners' appeal, this Court reiterated the rule that anyone seeking exemption from the application of the mandatory nature of the payment of docket fees has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant a departure from the requirement of the law. Of the same tenor is our ruling in Enriquez v. Enriquez,[28] in which we repeated that concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[29]

GR No. 173127

2007-10-17

DEE HWA LIONG ELECTRONICS CORPORATION v. EMELINDA PAPIONA

CARPIO MORALES, J.

This Court is not unmindful of instances where, consistent with the spirit of liberality infused in the Rules of Court, it overlooked the lack of proper assignment of errors and considered errors not assigned. Concomitant to a liberal application of the Rules, however, the party invoking it should at least proffer a reason behind its failure to comply therewith,[17] an exceptionally meritorious one to warrant liberality.[18]

GR No. 173942

2007-10-15

FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES v. MARIETTA J. HOMENA-VALENCIA

TINGA, J,

In Enriquez v. Enriquez,[12] we illustrated at length the scope and history of the requirement laid down in Section 4, Rule 41. Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, payment of appellate court docket fee is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal. In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that although an appeal fee is required to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, it is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under Sections 20 2 and 23 3 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are only two requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a) the filing with the trial court of a notice of appeal within the reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.

GR NO. 167620

2007-04-03

CAROLINA B. VILLENA v. ROMEO Z. RUPISAN

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In all, what emerges from all of the above is that the rules of procedure in the matter of paying the docket fees must be followed. However, there are exceptions to the stringent requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application of the rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.[48]

	GR No. 198753 2015-03-25	JOSE “PEPE” SANICO v. PEOPLE BERSAMIN, J.
We are appalled that the CA turned a blind eye to the egregious error of the RTC by limiting its attention to the supposedly patent defects and shortcomings of the petitioner's petition for review. The foremost noted defect was the non-payment of the docket fees, which, in other circumstances, would have alone warranted the outright rejection of the petition for review due to the mandatory and jurisdictional character of the payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period.[26] Such payment was the condition sine qua non for the perfection of the appeal by petition for review, and only by such payment could the CA have acquired jurisdiction over the appeal.[27] But the appeal of the conviction before the RTC had not yet been completed, and, as such, the petition for review of the petitioner was logically premature. In other words, it was plain to the CA that it could not validly act on the petition for review. To insist otherwise would be unjust against the petitioner, considering that the wrong turn in procedure that had generated the whole problem had been caused by the RTC.
	GR No. 180064 2013-09-16	JOSE U. PUA v. CITIBANK PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that cases falling under Section 57 of the SRC, which pertain to civil liabilities arising from violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as well as other civil suits under Sections 56, 58, 59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought before the regional trial courts. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.[35] Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC provision of similar import is found in its sections governing criminal suits; quite the contrary, the SRC states that criminal cases arising from violations of its provisions should be first referred to the SEC.
	GR No. 191660 2012-12-03	DELIA T. SUTTON v. ROMANITO P. LIM PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context particularly, that every part of the statute must be interpreted together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[22] Therefore, in line with the purpose of recognizing the right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners under the agrarian reform program, both paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 should be understood within the context of tenurial arrangements, else the intent of the law be subverted.
	GR No. 187104 2010-08-03	SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS BRION, J.
The rulings in these cases have been consistently reiterated in subsequent cases: Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,[34] Pedrosa v. Spouses Hill,[35] Gegare v. Court of Appeals,[36] Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,[37] Sps. Manalili v. Sps. de Leon,[38] La Salette College v. Pilotin,[39] Saint Louis University v. Spouses Cordero,[40] M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva,[41] Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo,[42] Meatmasters Int'l. Corp. v. Lelis Integrated Dev't. Corp.,[43] Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr.,[44] Enriquez v. Enriquez,[45] KLT Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits, Inc.,[46] Tan v. Link,[47] Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Yap,[48] and most recently in Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO),[49] and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
	GR No. 178989 2010-03-18	EAGLE RIDGE GOLF v. CA VELASCO JR., J.
As with most rules of procedure, however, exceptions are invariably recognized and the relaxation of procedural rules on review has been effected to obviate jeopardizing substantial justice.[36] This liberality stresses the importance of review in our judicial grievance structure to accord every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[37] But concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[38]
	AM No. 08-2-01-0 2010-02-11	RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM CORONA, J.
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.[19] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.[20] Appellate docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period for taking an appeal.[21] Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.[22] Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[23]
	GR No. 172574 2009-07-31	NOLI LIM v. ANGELITO DELOS SANTOS NOW HIS HEIRS PUNO, C.J.
It is a well-established rule that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.[18] Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision or final order sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[19] The payment of docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.[20]
	GR Nos. 154211-12 2009-06-22	SPS. ERNESTO F. CURATA AND LOURDES M. CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VELASCO JR., J.
Among the grounds that pertinent jurisprudence has recognized as justifying the loosening up of the stringent requirement on payment of docket fees are: (1) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (2) good faith of the defaulting party by paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is frivolous and dilatory; (6) no unjust prejudice to the other party; and (7) importance of the issues involved. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[99]
	GR No. 174219 2007-11-23	KLT FRUITS v. WSR FRUITS CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It bears stressing that while we have laid down the rule on the discretionary interpretation of the rules on the perfection of an appeal or the payment of docket fees, we have also in some cases refused to give due course to an appeal for failure to pay docket fees. Thus, in Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr.,[27] petitioners therein failed to pay the docket fees on the ground that they were not advised by the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to when to pay the same. In affirming the dismissal of therein petitioners' appeal, this Court reiterated the rule that anyone seeking exemption from the application of the mandatory nature of the payment of docket fees has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant a departure from the requirement of the law. Of the same tenor is our ruling in Enriquez v. Enriquez,[28] in which we repeated that concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[29]
	GR No. 173127 2007-10-17	DEE HWA LIONG ELECTRONICS CORPORATION v. EMELINDA PAPIONA CARPIO MORALES, J.
This Court is not unmindful of instances where, consistent with the spirit of liberality infused in the Rules of Court, it overlooked the lack of proper assignment of errors and considered errors not assigned. Concomitant to a liberal application of the Rules, however, the party invoking it should at least proffer a reason behind its failure to comply therewith,[17] an exceptionally meritorious one to warrant liberality.[18]
	GR No. 173942 2007-10-15	FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES v. MARIETTA J. HOMENA-VALENCIA TINGA, J,
In Enriquez v. Enriquez,[12] we illustrated at length the scope and history of the requirement laid down in Section 4, Rule 41. Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, payment of appellate court docket fee is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal. In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that although an appeal fee is required to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, it is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under Sections 20 2 and 23 3 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are only two requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a) the filing with the trial court of a notice of appeal within the reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.
	GR NO. 167620 2007-04-03	CAROLINA B. VILLENA v. ROMEO Z. RUPISAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In all, what emerges from all of the above is that the rules of procedure in the matter of paying the docket fees must be followed. However, there are exceptions to the stringent requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application of the rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.[48]

CIPRIANO ENRIQUEZ v. MAXIMO ENRIQUEZ