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AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL v. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 196271 2011-10-18	DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA v. SENATE OF PHILIPPINES BRION, J.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view - like the extension of the elective term - is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.[56] Hence, holdover - whichever way it is viewed - is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
	GR No. 176579 2011-06-28	WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES CARPIO, J.
Respondent Pangilinan further asserts that "Section 11, [Article XII of the Constitution] imposes no nationality requirement on the shareholders of the utility company as a condition for keeping their shares in the utility company." According to him, "Section 11 does not authorize taking one person's property (the shareholder's stock in the utility company) on the basis of another party's alleged failure to satisfy a requirement that is a condition only for that other party's retention of another piece of property (the utility company being at least 60% Filipino-owned to keep its franchise)."[36]
	GR No. 184740 2010-02-11	DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA VILLARAMA, JR., J.
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[27] In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the President's appointment or designation of a Department Undersecretary as officer-in-charge of an attached agency will arise in every such appointment.[28]
	GR No. 166886 2008-07-30	MATTEL v. EMMA FRANCISCO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita,[34] the petition questioned the constitutionality of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's appointment of acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress was in session. While the President extended ad interim appointments to her appointees immediately after the recess of Congress, the Court still resolved the petition, noting that the question of the constitutionality of the President's appointment of department secretaries in acting capacities while Congress was in session was one capable of repetition.
	GR No. 144322 2007-02-06	METROPOLITAN BANK v. NATIONAL WAGES AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As to respondents' submission that the implementation of the Wage Order can no longer be restrained since it has become fait accompli, the Wage Order having taken effect on January 1, 1996 and its implementing rules approved on February 14, 1996, suffice it to state that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[36] Besides, a case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Such circumstances do not obtain in the present case. The implementation of the Wage Order does not in any way render the case moot and academic, since the issue of the validity of the wage order subsists even after its implementation and which has to be determined and passed upon to resolve petitioner's rights and consequent obligations therein.