Lawyerly

GR No. 202789

2015-06-22

VELASCO JR., J.

On July 25, 2005, in Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torre,[8] however, this Court annulled the adverted Sec. 5 of EO 80, in effect withdrawing the preferential tax treatment heretofore enjoyed by all businesses located in the CSEZ.

GR No. 175368

2013-04-11

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF PHILIPPINES v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

PERALTA, J.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid.[20] This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.[21] This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,[22] leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.[23]

GR No. 192935

2010-12-07

LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

MENDOZA, J.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo's assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the President's first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

GR No. 192935

2010-12-07

LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

MENDOZA, J.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.[53] One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

GR No. 187972

2010-06-29

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT v. FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

VELASCO JR., J.

PAGCOR maintains that the license it issued to the FDC was based on Sec. 5 of EO 80 and that its charter PD 1869 should be read together with said EO. When Sec. 5 was nullified in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[13] the MOA it entered into with FDC was consequently voided.

GR No. 176006

2010-03-26

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL

CORONA, J.

The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."[25] The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.[26] The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.[27]

GR No. 160756

2010-03-09

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO

CORONA, J.

The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."[85] Stated differently, all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.[86]

GR No. 180050

2010-02-10

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

PERALTA, J.

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[9] the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.[10]

GR No. 176951

2009-12-21

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

VELASCO JR., J.

It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.[41]

GR No. 168852

2008-09-30

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN v. SPS. PERFECTO C. TAN

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]

GR NO. 156041

2007-02-21

PEST MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINES v. FERTILIZER

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

There is also no evidence whatsoever to support petitioner's allegation that the grant of protection to proprietary data would result in restraining free trade. Petitioner did not adduce any reliable data to prove its bare allegation that the protection of proprietary data would unduly restrict trade on pesticides. Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority,[6] despite the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare." There can be no question that the unregulated use or proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our environment. Thus, in the aforecited case, the Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for removal of 'protective regulations'."[7] More recently, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[8] the Court held that "[t]he mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition." It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.

	GR No. 202789 2015-06-22	CIR v. PUREGOLD DUTY FREE VELASCO JR., J.
On July 25, 2005, in Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torre,[8] however, this Court annulled the adverted Sec. 5 of EO 80, in effect withdrawing the preferential tax treatment heretofore enjoyed by all businesses located in the CSEZ.
	GR No. 175368 2013-04-11	LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF PHILIPPINES v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT PERALTA, J.
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid.[20] This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.[21] This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,[22] leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.[23]
	GR No. 192935 2010-12-07	LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 MENDOZA, J.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo's assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the President's first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.
	GR No. 192935 2010-12-07	LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 MENDOZA, J.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.[53] One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
	GR No. 187972 2010-06-29	PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT v. FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VELASCO JR., J.
PAGCOR maintains that the license it issued to the FDC was based on Sec. 5 of EO 80 and that its charter PD 1869 should be read together with said EO. When Sec. 5 was nullified in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[13] the MOA it entered into with FDC was consequently voided.
	GR No. 176006 2010-03-26	NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL CORONA, J.
The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."[25] The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.[26] The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.[27]
	GR No. 160756 2010-03-09	CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO CORONA, J.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."[85] Stated differently, all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.[86]
	GR No. 180050 2010-02-10	RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA PERALTA, J.
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[9] the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.[10]
	GR No. 176951 2009-12-21	LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC VELASCO JR., J.
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.[41]
	GR No. 168852 2008-09-30	SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN v. SPS. PERFECTO C. TAN AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]
	GR NO. 156041 2007-02-21	PEST MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINES v. FERTILIZER AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
There is also no evidence whatsoever to support petitioner's allegation that the grant of protection to proprietary data would result in restraining free trade. Petitioner did not adduce any reliable data to prove its bare allegation that the protection of proprietary data would unduly restrict trade on pesticides. Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority,[6] despite the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare." There can be no question that the unregulated use or proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our environment. Thus, in the aforecited case, the Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for removal of 'protective regulations'."[7] More recently, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[8] the Court held that "[t]he mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition." It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION v. RUBEN TORRES