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COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION v. RUBEN TORRES

This case has been cited 11 times or more.

	GR No. 187972 2010-06-29	PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT v. FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VELASCO JR., J.
PAGCOR maintains that the license it issued to the FDC was based on Sec. 5 of EO 80 and that its charter PD 1869 should be read together with said EO. When Sec. 5 was nullified in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[13] the MOA it entered into with FDC was consequently voided.
	GR No. 176006 2010-03-26	NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL CORONA, J.
The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."[25] The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.[26] The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.[27]
	GR No. 160756 2010-03-09	CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO CORONA, J.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."[85] Stated differently, all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.[86]
	GR No. 180050 2010-02-10	RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA PERALTA, J.
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[9] the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.[10]
	GR No. 168852 2008-09-30	SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN v. SPS. PERFECTO C. TAN AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]
	GR NO. 156041 2007-02-21	PEST MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINES v. FERTILIZER AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
There is also no evidence whatsoever to support petitioner's allegation that the grant of protection to proprietary data would result in restraining free trade. Petitioner did not adduce any reliable data to prove its bare allegation that the protection of proprietary data would unduly restrict trade on pesticides. Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority,[6] despite the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare." There can be no question that the unregulated use or proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our environment. Thus, in the aforecited case, the Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for removal of 'protective regulations'."[7] More recently, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[8] the Court held that "[t]he mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition." It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.