This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2016-01-19 |
PER CURIAM |
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| In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his client's property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry which he presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone shows respondent lawyer's blatant disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence to the "pawning" of her jewelry becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from clients, unless the latter's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer's act of borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the latter's property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse.[22] The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.[23] The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.[24] Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction. | |||||
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2012-11-14 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Atty. Gonzales-Alzate's legal representation of Turqueza neither resulted in her betrayal of the fidelity and loyalty she owed to Seares, Jr. as his former attorney, nor invited the suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing while she was performing her duties as an attorney.[39] Representing conflicting interests would occur only where the attorney's new engagement would require her to use against a former client any confidential information gained from the previous professional relation.[40] The prohibition did not cover a situation where the subject matter of the present engagement was totally unrelated to the previous engagement of the attorney.[41] To constitute the violation, the attorney should be shown to intentionally use against the former client the confidential information acquired by her during the previous employment.[42] But a mere allegation of professional misconduct would not suffice to establish the charge, because accusation was not synonymous with guilt.[43] | |||||
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2008-03-07 |
TINGA, J, |
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| A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. [34] The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop.[35] The rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[36] In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.[37] | |||||
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2007-04-02 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand therefor. The lawyer's failure to return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer [of] funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.[19] (Emphasis supplied) Respondent must likewise be reminded that a lawyer should, at all times, comply with what the court lawfully requires.[20] It bears stressing that the judgment against him in Civil Case No. 7130 has long become final and executory. However, up to this date, he has failed to comply with the order to pay complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as well as interest and attorney's fees. His refusal to comply with the said order constitutes a willful disobedience to the court's lawful orders. | |||||
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2007-01-22 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| [15] Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 393, 400. | |||||
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2006-10-30 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| In the case of Pedro Tesado, Nelson Havana and Rizaldo Monte who were already paid their terminal pay, they can still be reinstated provided they refund the equivalent amount for terminal pay. In time, the petitioner mayor moved for a reconsideration. But in a subsequent Order[3] dated April 8, 2003, the same CSC Regional Office denied the motion. The mayor's appeal also suffered the same fate as it was likewise denied by the CSC proper in its Resolution[4] of August 26, 2005, viz: WHEREFORE, the appeal of Mayor Renato S. Muñez is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the CSCRO No. III Order dated April 8, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of Mayor Muñez from the CSCRO No. XIII Order dated January 21, 2003, which declared the abolition of positions in said agency as null and void and ordered the reinstatement of Pablito Jomo, et al., is AFFIRMED. The separated employees are reinstated without loss of seniority rights, leave credits, and full payment of back wages pursuant to Section 9, Republic Act No. 6656. Provided, that those employees who had received their terminal pay shall reimburse the same amount received or shall have the same deducted from their back wages. Provided further, that those employees who were hired as casual employees following their separation shall have the income derived during their illegal separation deducted from their back wages. Ultimately, the petitioner mayor elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for review initiated by a motion for extension of time within which to file said petition, tentatively docketed in the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 00611. | |||||