Lawyerly

GR No. 183212

2015-03-16

WALLEM PHILIPPINES SERVICES v. HEIRS OF LATE PETER PADRONES

PERALTA, J.

On the other hand, in their Comment/Opposition to [herein petitioners'] Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal,[28] respondents only prayed that the grant of death benefits and attorney's fees in their favor be affirmed by the NLRC. Nothing therein shows that they raised before the LA, the NLRC or even the CA the issue of their or Padrones' entitlement to disability benefits. The resolution of this issue requires the admission and calibration of evidence and since respondents did not specifically raise this matter in the proceedings before the LA and the NLRC, these tribunals were not given a chance to pass upon it in their assailed decisions. Hence, the issue of whether or not Padrones or his beneficiaries are entitled to disability benefits cannot be passed upon on appeal because it was not raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.[29]

GR No. 192406

2015-01-21

ONE SHIPPING CORP. v. IMELDA C. PEÑAFIEL

PERALTA, J.

Therefore, this Court finds no substantial evidence to prove that Ildefonso's illness which caused his death was aggravated during the term of his contract. [T]he death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that: (a) the seaman died of the same illness; (b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise.[16]

GR No. 188595

2013-08-28

SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES v. NENITA P. SALAZAR

SERENO, C.J.

In any event, even if it were proven that Armando worked in the cargo section of the ship, the CA must still find justification for how his work environment caused his constant headaches, whether he recovered from his ailment,[37] and how it worsened into the alleged fatal illness.[38]

GR No. 168715

2010-09-15

MEDLINE MANAGEMENT v. S

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Moreover, there is no evidence to show that Juliano's illness was acquired during the term of his employment with petitioners. In respondents' Position Paper,[26] they admitted that Juliano was discharged not because of any illness but due to the expiration of his employment contract.[27] Although they stated that Juliano was hospitalized on August 28, 1999, or five months before his contract expired, they presented no proof to support this allegation. Instead, what respondents presented were the Medical Certificates[28] issued by Dr. Lloren attesting to the fact that on March 6, 2000, Juliano consulted her complaining of abdominal distention. We find this not substantial evidence to prove that Juliano's illness which caused his death was contracted during the term of his contract.[29] "Indeed, the death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that: a) the seaman died of the same illness; b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise."[30] In the instant case, Juliano was repatriated not because of any illness but because his contract of employment expired. There is likewise no proof that he contracted his illness during the term of his employment or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death.

GR No. 183646

2009-09-18

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. v. SURIGAO

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

It is true that the beneficent provisions of the Standard Employment Contract are liberally construed in favor of Filipino seafarers and their dependents.[22] We commiserate with respondents for the unfortunate fate that befell their loved one; however, we find that the factual circumstances in this case do not justify the grant of death benefits as prayed for by them as beneficiaries of Salvador.

GR No. 182320

2009-09-11

TACLOBAN FAR EAST MARKETING CORPORATION v. CA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

The NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly found that petitioners failed to substantiate its claim that Sabulao abandoned his work. No evidence was presented to prove that Sabulao clearly intended to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts. As regards petitioners' allegation that Sabulao is a field personnel and therefore not entitled to the money claims awarded by the NLRC, suffice it to state that the issue was raised only before the Court of Appeals in contravention to the rule that questions not raised before the tribunals a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[16] As such, it deserves no consideration by this Court.

GR No. 184225

2009-09-04

SPS. ROGELIO F. LOPEZ AND TEOTIMA G. LOPEZ v. SPS. SAMUEL R. ESPINOSA AND ANGELITA S. ESPINOSA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

The Court affirms the award of Php85,200.00 representing the value of improvements and attorney's fees. The issue on the propriety of the award was raised for the first time on motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[26]

GR No. 167809

2008-11-27

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. JOSEFINA R. DUMLAO

REYES, R.T., J.

Pursuant to PD No. 27 and Executive Order (EO) No. 228,[11] a preliminary valuation was made by the DAR on the landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 41504 and T-1180 with a total area of 16.3939 hectares. Finding the valuation to be correct, petitioner bank informed respondents of the said valuation.[12] Payments were then deposited in the name of the landowners.[13] Meanwhile, processing of the properties covered by the other four (4) titles, namely, TCT Nos. 41505, 41506, 41507 and 41508, remains pending with the DAR.[14]

GR No. 168210

2008-06-17

COASTAL SAFEWAY MARINE SERVICES

QUISUMBING, J.

Stated differently, for death of a seafarer to be compensable, the death must occur during the term of his contract of employment.[25] It is the only condition for compensability of a seafarer's death.[26] Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable.[27] In Jerry's case, the parties did not dispute that Jerry died due to heart ailment during the term of his employment. Aside from the fact that respondent had submitted Jerry's death certificate, petitioner admits such fact of death as early as the time it had submitted its first position paper with the NLRC.

GR No. 175005

2008-04-30

ESTATE OF POSEDIO ORTEGA v. CA

TINGA, J,

Thus, as we declared in Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc.,[12] Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita, Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita,[13] and Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc v. Beneficiaries of Allas,[14] in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. On this basis alone, the petition should be dismissed.

GR No. 168560

2008-01-28

KLAVENESS MARITIME AGENCY v. BENEFICIARIES OF LATE SECOND OFFICER ANTHONY S. ALLAS

TINGA, J,

[15] G.R. No. 141505, 18 August 2005, 467 SCRA 301, 309. In this case, the Court, citing NFD International Manning Agents v. National Labor Relations Commission, 284 SCRA 239, 247 (1998), had the occasion to rule that:x x x it is clear from the provisions of the Standard Employment Contract that the only condition for compensability of a seafarer's death is that such death must occur during the effectivity of the seafarer's contract of employment.

GR NO. 166580

2007-02-08

PRUDENTIAL SHIPPING v. EMERLINDA A. STA. RITA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. [45] However, if the seaman dies after the termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits enumerated above. [46]

	GR No. 183212 2015-03-16	WALLEM PHILIPPINES SERVICES v. HEIRS OF LATE PETER PADRONES PERALTA, J.
On the other hand, in their Comment/Opposition to [herein petitioners'] Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal,[28] respondents only prayed that the grant of death benefits and attorney's fees in their favor be affirmed by the NLRC. Nothing therein shows that they raised before the LA, the NLRC or even the CA the issue of their or Padrones' entitlement to disability benefits. The resolution of this issue requires the admission and calibration of evidence and since respondents did not specifically raise this matter in the proceedings before the LA and the NLRC, these tribunals were not given a chance to pass upon it in their assailed decisions. Hence, the issue of whether or not Padrones or his beneficiaries are entitled to disability benefits cannot be passed upon on appeal because it was not raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.[29]
	GR No. 192406 2015-01-21	ONE SHIPPING CORP. v. IMELDA C. PEÑAFIEL PERALTA, J.
Therefore, this Court finds no substantial evidence to prove that Ildefonso's illness which caused his death was aggravated during the term of his contract. [T]he death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that: (a) the seaman died of the same illness; (b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise.[16]
	GR No. 188595 2013-08-28	SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES v. NENITA P. SALAZAR SERENO, C.J.
In any event, even if it were proven that Armando worked in the cargo section of the ship, the CA must still find justification for how his work environment caused his constant headaches, whether he recovered from his ailment,[37] and how it worsened into the alleged fatal illness.[38]
	GR No. 168715 2010-09-15	MEDLINE MANAGEMENT v. S DEL CASTILLO, J.
Moreover, there is no evidence to show that Juliano's illness was acquired during the term of his employment with petitioners. In respondents' Position Paper,[26] they admitted that Juliano was discharged not because of any illness but due to the expiration of his employment contract.[27] Although they stated that Juliano was hospitalized on August 28, 1999, or five months before his contract expired, they presented no proof to support this allegation. Instead, what respondents presented were the Medical Certificates[28] issued by Dr. Lloren attesting to the fact that on March 6, 2000, Juliano consulted her complaining of abdominal distention. We find this not substantial evidence to prove that Juliano's illness which caused his death was contracted during the term of his contract.[29] "Indeed, the death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that: a) the seaman died of the same illness; b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise."[30] In the instant case, Juliano was repatriated not because of any illness but because his contract of employment expired. There is likewise no proof that he contracted his illness during the term of his employment or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death.
	GR No. 183646 2009-09-18	GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. v. SURIGAO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is true that the beneficent provisions of the Standard Employment Contract are liberally construed in favor of Filipino seafarers and their dependents.[22] We commiserate with respondents for the unfortunate fate that befell their loved one; however, we find that the factual circumstances in this case do not justify the grant of death benefits as prayed for by them as beneficiaries of Salvador.
	GR No. 182320 2009-09-11	TACLOBAN FAR EAST MARKETING CORPORATION v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly found that petitioners failed to substantiate its claim that Sabulao abandoned his work. No evidence was presented to prove that Sabulao clearly intended to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts. As regards petitioners' allegation that Sabulao is a field personnel and therefore not entitled to the money claims awarded by the NLRC, suffice it to state that the issue was raised only before the Court of Appeals in contravention to the rule that questions not raised before the tribunals a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[16] As such, it deserves no consideration by this Court.
	GR No. 184225 2009-09-04	SPS. ROGELIO F. LOPEZ AND TEOTIMA G. LOPEZ v. SPS. SAMUEL R. ESPINOSA AND ANGELITA S. ESPINOSA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The Court affirms the award of Php85,200.00 representing the value of improvements and attorney's fees. The issue on the propriety of the award was raised for the first time on motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[26]
	GR No. 167809 2008-11-27	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. JOSEFINA R. DUMLAO REYES, R.T., J.
Pursuant to PD No. 27 and Executive Order (EO) No. 228,[11] a preliminary valuation was made by the DAR on the landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 41504 and T-1180 with a total area of 16.3939 hectares. Finding the valuation to be correct, petitioner bank informed respondents of the said valuation.[12] Payments were then deposited in the name of the landowners.[13] Meanwhile, processing of the properties covered by the other four (4) titles, namely, TCT Nos. 41505, 41506, 41507 and 41508, remains pending with the DAR.[14]
	GR No. 168210 2008-06-17	COASTAL SAFEWAY MARINE SERVICES QUISUMBING, J.
Stated differently, for death of a seafarer to be compensable, the death must occur during the term of his contract of employment.[25] It is the only condition for compensability of a seafarer's death.[26] Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable.[27] In Jerry's case, the parties did not dispute that Jerry died due to heart ailment during the term of his employment. Aside from the fact that respondent had submitted Jerry's death certificate, petitioner admits such fact of death as early as the time it had submitted its first position paper with the NLRC.
	GR No. 175005 2008-04-30	ESTATE OF POSEDIO ORTEGA v. CA TINGA, J,
Thus, as we declared in Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc.,[12] Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita, Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita,[13] and Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc v. Beneficiaries of Allas,[14] in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. On this basis alone, the petition should be dismissed.
	GR No. 168560 2008-01-28	KLAVENESS MARITIME AGENCY v. BENEFICIARIES OF LATE SECOND OFFICER ANTHONY S. ALLAS TINGA, J,
[15] G.R. No. 141505, 18 August 2005, 467 SCRA 301, 309. In this case, the Court, citing NFD International Manning Agents v. National Labor Relations Commission, 284 SCRA 239, 247 (1998), had the occasion to rule that:x x x it is clear from the provisions of the Standard Employment Contract that the only condition for compensability of a seafarer's death is that such death must occur during the effectivity of the seafarer's contract of employment.
	GR NO. 166580 2007-02-08	PRUDENTIAL SHIPPING v. EMERLINDA A. STA. RITA CALLEJO, SR., J.
The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. [45] However, if the seaman dies after the termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits enumerated above. [46]

NORMA HERMOGENES v. OSCO SHIPPING SERVICES