This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2013-03-20 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for review at bench primarily assails the Decision[1] dated 22 May 2006 rendered by the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60769,[2] reversing the Decision dated 20 August 1997 in turn rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Southern Leyte (RTC) in Civil Case No. R-263.[3] | |||||
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2013-03-20 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| On appeal, the foregoing Decision was reversed and set aside in the herein assailed 22 May 2006 Decision rendered by the CA's Twentieth Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 60769. The CA ruled that plaintiffs Maamo were the true and lawful owners of the litigated portion, upon the following findings and conclusions: (a) the 29 October 1934 deed Placido executed in favor of Antonia was a mere affirmation of an earlier sale made on 12 October 1912, hence, the acquisition of the litigated portion by plaintiffs Maamo's predecessor-in-interest predated Simplecio's 17 October 1934 entry thereon; (b) defendants Palapo traced their claim to Concepcion's 1906 TD which pertained to a different parcel situated in Barrio Pandan, Liloan, Leyte; (c) the claim that the litigated portion was inherited from Concepcion had been rejected in the 17 December 1934 Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 298 which appears to have been returned duly served and executed; and, (e) since the possessory rights of plaintiffs Maamo's predecessor-in-interest had been affirmed and restored, Simplecio's continued possession of the portion in litigation was by mere tolerance and could not, therefore, ripen into ownership acquired by prescription, laches or estoppel.[20] | |||||
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2013-03-20 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| In the meantime, the death of some of the original parties to the case resulted in their substitution by their respective heirs. Simeon, Sr. was substituted by his wife and children, respondents Crispina, Simeon, Jr., Aselita, Remedios, Evansueda, Carmelita, Manuel, Elizabeth, Adelaida and Miguel II, all surnamed Maamo. As a consequence, they were joined in the case with the surviving plaintiffs Maamo, (now respondents) Fabian Sr., Juliana, Olivo, Silvestre Sr., Angela, Bonifacia and Estelita, all surnamed Maamo. On defendants Palapo's side, Roberto was substituted by petitioners Lydia Veronica, Alily, Beverly and Maricar, all surnamed Palapo.[21] Juanito was, likewise, substituted by petitioners Generoso, Perla, Juanito Jr., Delia, Raul, Editha and Elvira, all surnamed Palapo. Arsenia was, in turn, substituted by her children, petitioners V[e]vencia, Rogelio, Elizabeth, Josefina, Eusebio, Gavina and Amelita, all surnamed Enchin. Crispiniano was, finally, substituted by his children, petitioners Angelita, Normita, Apolonia, Bining and Inday, all surnamed Palapo.[22] | |||||
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2011-11-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Neither may private respondent's refusal to report for work subsequent to the Labor Arbiter's issuance of an order for his reinstatement be considered as another abandonment of his job. It is a settled rule that failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been served does not necessarily constitute abandonment.[19] As defined under established jurisprudence, abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.[20] It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.[21] For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work.[22] The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.[23] In the instant case, private respondent claimed that his subsequent refusal to report for work despite the Labor Arbiter's order for his reinstatement is due to the fact that he was subsequently made to perform the job of a "bodegero" of which he is unfamiliar and which is totally different from his previous task of "mastering tape." Moreover, he was assigned to a different workplace, which is a warehouse, where he was isolated from all other employees. The Court notes that petitioners failed to refute the foregoing claims of private respondent in their pleadings filed with the CA. It is only in their Reply filed with this Court that they simply denied and brushed off private respondent's assertion that he was made to work as a "bodegero." The Court is, thus, led to conclude that petitioners' failure to immediately refute the claims of private respondent is an implied admission thereof. In the same vein, the Court treats petitioners' belated denial of the same claims of private respondent as mere afterthought which is not worthy of credence. | |||||
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2011-11-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| This Court has ruled in many instances that reinstatement is no longer viable where, among others, the relations between the employer and the employee have been so severely strained, that it is not in the best interest of the parties, nor is it advisable or practical to order reinstatement, or where the employee decides not to be reinstated.[30] In the instant case, the resulting circumstances show that reinstatement would be impractical and would hardly promote the best interest of the parties. Resentment and enmity between petitioners and private respondent necessarily strained the relationship between them or even provoked antipathy and antagonism as shown by the acts of the parties subsequent to the order of reinstatement. Besides, private respondent expressly prayed for an award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement from the very start of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. By so doing, he forecloses reinstatement as a relief by implication. | |||||
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2007-04-03 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It bears emphasis that for termination of employment on the ground of abandonment to be considered valid, the employer must prove,[27] by substantial evidence,[28] the concurrence of two essential requisites: first, the failure of the employee to report for work or his absence from work without valid or justifiable reason;[29] and second, his clear and deliberate intention to discontinue his employment.[30] The second requisite, considered to be the more crucial one, may be established by evidence of overt acts on the part of the employee from which may be inferred a lack of intention to resume his work.[31] | |||||
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2007-01-30 |
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| Worth stressing, we find sufficient reason to agree with the appellate court that petitioner failed in this case to prove that respondent abandoned her job. While respondent filed the complaint 20 months after her dismissal, such filing was well within the four-year prescriptive period allowed to institute an action for illegal dismissal.[27] This Court had previously considered a non-issue[28] the lapse of several months,[29] e.g. eight months,[30] nine months,[31] and two years and five months[32] before filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. | |||||