This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2010-04-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| As a general rule, courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.[11] | |||||
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2009-09-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The aforesaid general rule, however, is not absolute. Where special circumstances clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal, then the special civil action of certiorari may exceptionally be allowed. This Court categorically stated in Salonga v. Cruz Paño[23] that under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice.[24] | |||||
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2009-06-22 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| While the general rule proscribes the appeal of an interlocutory order, there are also recognized exceptions to that rule. Where special circumstances clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal, then the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed.[126] This Court recognizes that, under certain situations, recourse to extraordinary legal remedies, such as a petition for certiorari, is considered proper to question the denial of a motion to quash (or any other interlocutory order) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice;"[127] or to promote public welfare and public policy;[128] or when the cases "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;"[129] or when the order was rendered with grave abuse of discretion.[130] Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order: (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.[131] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no showing of evident bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective acts of the respondents. It must be stressed that it is good faith, not bad faith, which is presumed, as the chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which springs from the fountain of good conscience.[31] | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| It bears stressing that no less than the officers of NASLU-FFW, the duly certified bargaining agent of respondent's rank-and-file employees, confirmed that in drafting the CBA, the intent of the parties was to make payment of the separation package for retrenched employees exclusive of retirement benefits. These officers were members of the negotiating panel for the 1991-1994 CBA and the 1994-1996 CBA between NASLU-FFW and the management. In their affidavits, they attested that under the CBA, an employee who is separated pursuant to a retrenchment program and who received the corresponding separation package is completely proscribed from demanding and claiming payment of retirement benefits provided under Section 1, Article XIV of the said CBA.[20] The members of the management panel during the CBA negotiations also executed their own affidavits and confirmed that payment of separation pay precludes entitlement to retirement benefits.[21] Petitioners claim that the union officers were acting "in connivance" with management in executing the said affidavits. However, petitioners presented no proof whatsoever that the union officers were acting in bad faith in executing their affidavits. It is elementary that bad faith is never presumed while good faith is always presumed. Therefore, he who claims bad faith must prove it.[22] For this reason, the CA correctly considered and relied upon the affidavits in determining the true intent of the parties to the 1994-1996 CBA. Neither do these affidavits constitute a violation of the waiver clause of the 1994-1996 CBA which merely states that "no event prior or subsequent to the effective date hereof shall amend nor shall it be the basis for any procedure under this Agreement." The questioned affidavits do not attempt to amend the CBA or to insert any new terms or procedure into the CBA but only serve to confirm the management and the union's true intention in entering into the existing provisions of the said CBA. | |||||
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2008-08-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| [41] Principio v. Barrientos, G.R. No. 167025, 19 December 2005, 478 SCRA 639, 646. | |||||