This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2012-02-15 |
REYES, J. |
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| Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained.[21] To distinguish one from the other, a question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[22] Certainly, the finding of negligence by the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon as this would entail going into the factual matters on which the negligence was based.[23] Moreover, it was not shown that the present case falls under any of the recognized exceptions[24] to the oft repeated principle according great weight and respect to the factual findings of the trial court and the CA. | |||||
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2009-11-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.[46] Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand.[47] It is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something that a prudent and reasonable man would not do.[48] | |||||
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2009-11-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, this Court laid down this test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence.[49] | |||||
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2009-11-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The issue of who, between the parties, was negligent is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions.[12] The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that ANECO's negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by respondents bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting them with our own. The function of this Court is limited to the review of the appellate court's alleged errors of law. We are not required to weigh all over again the factual evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[13] ANECO has not shown that it is entitled to be excepted from this rule. It has not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review. | |||||
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2007-11-22 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The finding that the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the fire that destroyed portions of the leased units is a purely factual matter which we cannot pass upon,[25] lest we overstep the restriction that review by certiorari under Rule 45 be limited to errors of law only.[26] | |||||
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2007-10-15 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| As held in the case of Philippine National Railway v. Brunty,[17] it may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings, and erect at such points, at sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains.[18] The failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed. | |||||
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2007-06-22 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| "The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante."[20] Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[21] The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. | |||||
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2007-06-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borres was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following Section 45(b) of RA 4136, Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the center of the highway. However, Deocampo was equally negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing the U-turn. Deocampo should have also slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampo admitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about 20 meters away from him.[13] Vehicular traffic was light at the time of the incident. The pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the road.[14] Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving very fast before the collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We sustain this finding since factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this Court.[15] Further, the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. It would not have happened if Deocampo was not driving very fast. | |||||