This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2014-04-02 |
REYES, J. |
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| The Court made a similar observation in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (now P.D. Monfort North), Municipality of Dumangas,[33] the facts of which bear resemblance to the facts at hand. In Dolar, the petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages involving a land he had earlier donated to the respondent. The petitioner claimed that the donation had ceased to be effective when the respondent failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. As relief, the petitioner prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of the property. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the petitioner's cause of action for revocation has already prescribed and as such, its claim for quieting of title is ineffective notwithstanding that the latter cause of action is imprescriptible. In sustaining such dismissal, the Court remarked: As aptly observed by the trial court, the petitory portion of petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 98-033 seeks for a judgment declaring him the absolute owner of the donated property, a plea which necessarily includes the revocation of the deed of donation in question. Verily, a declaration of petitioner's absolute ownership appears legally possible only when the deed of donation is contextually declared peremptorily revoked. | |||||
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2008-09-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioner's statement that neither party to the donation has expressly rescinded the contract is flawed. As above ruled, the deed of donation contains a stipulation that allows automatic reversion. Such stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding on the parties to the donation. As held in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas,[69] citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals[70]:The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. | |||||