This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-09-24 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Notably, the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed even if bad faith is not attendant.[11] Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that Coloma did not act in bad faith in rendering his report, his negligence under the circumstances was not only gross but also inexcusable. Again, it was clearly established that the degree of his involvement in the project may not excuse his ignorance of the realistic progress of RTS 9. He should have exercised care in his declaration in the report, especially because he had the duty to oversee the development of the project. | |||||
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2013-07-31 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In this relation, it must be clarified that the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan[29](Arias) cannot be applied to exculpate petitioners in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have prompted them to exercise a higher degree of circumspection, and consequently, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared. In particular, the tampered dates on some of the RIVs, the incomplete certification by GSC SAO Mateo on the date of receipt of the CCIE items, the missing details on the Reports of Public Property Purchased and the fact that sixteen checks all dated January 15, 1992 were payable to PNP SSS should have aroused a reasonable sense of suspicion or curiosity on their part if only to determine that they were not approving a fraudulent transaction. In a similar case where the documents in question bore irregularities too evident to ignore, the Court in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan[30] carved out an exception to the Arias doctrine and as such, held: Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional circumstance which should have prodded petitioner, if he were out to protect the interest of the municipality he swore to serve, to be curious and go beyond what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine, the added reason contemplated in Arias which would have put petitioner on his guard and examine the check/s and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before signing the same was obtaining in this case. | |||||
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2011-07-06 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,[44] we affirmed that a prosecution for violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.[45] | |||||
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2006-12-20 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| It must be stressed that the alterations made by petitioner compromised the identity of the private complainant's property. The fact that petitioner restored the original entries in the tax declarations is of no moment; restoration of the entries in the tax declaration is not one of those enumerated under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code[82] as one of the ways by which to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code applies in a suppletory character as provided for under Article 10[83] of the same Code.[84] | |||||
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2006-02-10 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| We refer to the unusual fact that the checks issued as payment for construction materials purchased by the municipality were not made payable to the supplier, Kelly Lumber, but to petitioner himself even as the disbursement vouchers attached thereto were in the name of Kelly Lumber. The discrepancy between the names indicated in the checks, on one hand, and those in the disbursement vouchers, on the other, should have alerted petitioner - if he were conscientious of his duties as he purports to be - that something was definitely amiss. x x x[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) | |||||
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2005-12-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioner is being indicted for nine (9) counts each for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The elements[15] of the offense defined under Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 are the following: 1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial, functions; 3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether Government or a private person; 4) that such injury is caused by giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such party; and 5) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. To be indicted of the offense under Section 3(g) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the following elements[16] must be present: | |||||