This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2008-07-21 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.[15] Petitioners' insistence that MV Doña Paz was at fault at the time of the collision will entail this Court's review and determination of the weight, credence, and probative value of the evidence presented. This Court is being asked to evaluate the pieces of evidence which were adequately passed upon by both the RTC and the CA. Without doubt, this matter is essentially factual in character and, therefore, outside the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners ought to remember that this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not for this Court to weigh these pieces of evidence all over again.[16] | |||||
|
2007-06-08 |
NACHURA, J |
||||
| In this case, petitioners seek this Court's determination of the weight, credence, and probative value of the evidence presented. Moreover, petitioners question the certifications issued by respondent's immediate supervisor, Mrs. Norma Geronimo, by virtue of the latter's letter dated July 11, 2000 that she did not personally know respondent. Petitioners also introduce for the first time in evidence, a letter from the PWU in support of their allegation that respondent was taking up an Advertising course thereat during the contested period. Indubitably, these issues are factual in character. As the issues raised are not purely questions of law and are, therefore, not cognizable by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45, we are constrained from exercising our jurisdiction in this case. Petitioners ought to remember that this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not for the Court to weigh these pieces of evidence all over again.[23] Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, its findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court. [24] | |||||
|
2006-06-30 |
AZCUNA, J. |
||||
| Besides, on the merits, petitioner primarily challenges the finding of the Ombudsman that she disclosed her access code to Leomar B. Basuel, which is a factual issue. Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45. In order to resolve this issue, the Court would necessarily have to look into the probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings below. It is not the function of the Court to reexamine or reevaluate the evidence all over again.[23] This Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction in these cases being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[24] | |||||