Lawyerly

GR No. 164549

2009-09-18

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPS. AGUSTIN AND PILAR ROCAMORA

BRION, J.

Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been breached. They are recoverable only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations.[31] The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or abusive. Likewise, a breach of contract may give rise to exemplary damages only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.[32]

GR No. 173834

2009-04-24

ISABELITA CUNANAN v. JUMPING JAP TRADING CORPORATION

TINGA, J.

Prefatorily, the Court agrees with the appellate court in affirming the trial court ruling that Protacio is authorized to institute the complaint against the petitioners. The certification issued by the majority of the directors clearly indicates that he is authorized to demand and collect the corporation's claims over the Ayala Alabang property and the institution of actions in court.[20] The authority granted to Protacio is broad enough to enable him to take any legal action necessary to protect respondent's interest in the disputed property. This Court has also held that the power to institute actions necessarily includes the power to execute the verification and certification against forum shopping[21] required in initiatory pleadings, such as the complaint in Civil Case No. 02-189.

GR No. 179127

2008-12-24

IN-N-OUT BURGER v. SEHWANI

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In accordance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may likewise be awarded to petitioner since exemplary damages are awarded to it. Petitioner was compelled to protect its rights over the disputed mark. The amount of P500,000.00 is more than reasonable, given the fact that the case has dragged on for more than seven years, despite the respondent's failure to present countervailing evidence. Considering moreover the reputation of petitioner's counsel, the actual attorney's fees paid by petitioner would far exceed the amount that was awarded to it.[52]

GR No. 158621

2008-12-10

ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION v. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The award of attorney's fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court.[52] They may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an unjustified act by the other party.[53]

GR No. 160956

2008-02-13

Joaquin Quimpo v. Consuelo Abad Vda. de Beltran

NACHURA, J.

The grant of attorney's fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court. It may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an unjustified act by the other,[20] as in this case.

GR No. 155604

2007-11-22

COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN v. BELFRANLT DEVELOPMENT INC.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The finding that the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the fire that destroyed portions of the leased units is a purely factual matter which we cannot pass upon,[25] lest we overstep the restriction that review by certiorari under Rule 45 be limited to errors of law only.[26]

GR No. 155868

2007-02-06

SPS. GREGORIO v. NGO YET TE

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

In this case, the actual damages cannot be determined. Defendant-appellant Josefa Yu testified on supposed lost profits without clear and appreciable explanation. Despite her submission of the used and unused ticket stubs, there was no evidence on the daily net income, the routes plied by the bus and the average fares for each route. The submitted basis is too speculative and conjectural. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other evidence of profitability necessary to prove the amount of actual damages were presented. Thus, the Court a quo did not err in not awarding damages in favor of defendants-appellants.[64] We usually defer to the expertise of the CA, especially when it concurs with the factual findings of the RTC.[65] Indeed, findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by the Supreme Court in the following instances: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the lower court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions made without a citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (10) when the findings of fact of the lower court are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[66] However, the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions. We are in full accord with the CA that Spouses Yu failed to prove their counterclaim.

GR NO. 156025

2007-01-31

FORMER MAYOR BRIGIDO R. SIMON v. FLORIDA R. MARTINEZ

Exemplary damages, which are awarded to set an example for the public good[63] and which are given in accordance to the sound discretion of the court,[64] are also warranted in this case.

GR NO. 150157

2007-01-25

MAURICIO MANLICLIC v. MODESTO CALAUNAN

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.[38] Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[39] After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:

GR NO. 167071

2006-10-31

RUDY S. AMPELOQUIO v. ROMEO NAPIZA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Actions based upon a written contract should be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.[8] This accrual refers to the cause of action, which is defined as the act or the omission by which a party violates the right of another.[9] The period of prescription commences not from the date of the execution of the contract, but from the occurrence of the breach.[10] Prescription of actions, however, is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.[11] A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period.[12]

GR NO. 153468

2006-08-17

PAUL LEE TAN v. PAUL SYCIP

PANGANIBAN, CJ.

In the interest of substantial justice, this initial procedural lapse may be excused. [19] There appears to be no intention to circumvent the need for proper verification and certification, which are aimed at assuring the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the Petition for Review and at discouraging forum shopping.[20] More important, the substantial merits of petitioners' case and the purely legal question involved in the Petition should be considered special circumstances[21] or compelling reasons that justify an exception to the strict requirements of the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping.[22]

GR NO. 144635

2006-06-26

PROGRAMME INCORPORATED v. PROVINCE OF BATAAN

CORONA, J.

Time and again, we have ruled that factual matters are best evaluated by trial courts which can scrutinize evidence and hear testimony presented and offered by the parties (in this case, on the issue of ownership of the subject property). All the more does this principle ring true in this petition since such factual determination by the RTC was upheld by the CA.[9] Only questions of law are the proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, unless any of the known exceptions is extant in this case.[10] There is none.

GR NO. 146726

2006-06-16

MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MAKATI TUSCANY CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION

CALLEJO, SR., J.

In the more recent case of Naga Telephone Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[44] the Court made the following declaration: Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides, inter alia, that an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. Clearly, the ten (10) years period is to be reckoned from the time the right of action accrues which is not necessarily the date of execution of the contract. As correctly ruled by respondent court, private respondent's right of action arose "sometime during the latter part of 1982 or in 1983 when according to Atty. Luis General, Jr. x x x, he was asked by (private respondent's) Board of Directors to study said contract as it already appeared disadvantageous to (private respondent) (p. 31, tsn, May 8, 1989). Private respondent's cause of action to ask for reformation of said contract should thus be considered to have arisen only in 1982 or 1983, and from 1982 to January 2, 1989 when the complaint in this case was filed, ten (10) years had not yet elapsed.[45] This ruling was reiterated in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc., [46] where the Court declared that the cause of action of respondent therein arose upon its discovery of the short deliveries with certainty, since prior thereto, it had no indication that it was not getting what it was paying for. The Court declared that before then, there was yet no issue to speak of, and as such, respondent could not have brought an action against petitioner. It was stressed that "it was only after the discovery of the short deliveries that respondent got into position to bring an action for specific performance." Thus, the Court declared that the action was brought within the prescriptive period.[47]

	GR No. 164549 2009-09-18	PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPS. AGUSTIN AND PILAR ROCAMORA BRION, J.
Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been breached. They are recoverable only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations.[31] The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or abusive. Likewise, a breach of contract may give rise to exemplary damages only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.[32]
	GR No. 173834 2009-04-24	ISABELITA CUNANAN v. JUMPING JAP TRADING CORPORATION TINGA, J.
Prefatorily, the Court agrees with the appellate court in affirming the trial court ruling that Protacio is authorized to institute the complaint against the petitioners. The certification issued by the majority of the directors clearly indicates that he is authorized to demand and collect the corporation's claims over the Ayala Alabang property and the institution of actions in court.[20] The authority granted to Protacio is broad enough to enable him to take any legal action necessary to protect respondent's interest in the disputed property. This Court has also held that the power to institute actions necessarily includes the power to execute the verification and certification against forum shopping[21] required in initiatory pleadings, such as the complaint in Civil Case No. 02-189.
	GR No. 179127 2008-12-24	IN-N-OUT BURGER v. SEHWANI CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In accordance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may likewise be awarded to petitioner since exemplary damages are awarded to it. Petitioner was compelled to protect its rights over the disputed mark. The amount of P500,000.00 is more than reasonable, given the fact that the case has dragged on for more than seven years, despite the respondent's failure to present countervailing evidence. Considering moreover the reputation of petitioner's counsel, the actual attorney's fees paid by petitioner would far exceed the amount that was awarded to it.[52]
	GR No. 158621 2008-12-10	ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION v. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The award of attorney's fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court.[52] They may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an unjustified act by the other party.[53]
	GR No. 160956 2008-02-13	Joaquin Quimpo v. Consuelo Abad Vda. de Beltran NACHURA, J.
The grant of attorney's fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court. It may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an unjustified act by the other,[20] as in this case.
	GR No. 155604 2007-11-22	COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN v. BELFRANLT DEVELOPMENT INC. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The finding that the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the fire that destroyed portions of the leased units is a purely factual matter which we cannot pass upon,[25] lest we overstep the restriction that review by certiorari under Rule 45 be limited to errors of law only.[26]
	GR No. 155868 2007-02-06	SPS. GREGORIO v. NGO YET TE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In this case, the actual damages cannot be determined. Defendant-appellant Josefa Yu testified on supposed lost profits without clear and appreciable explanation. Despite her submission of the used and unused ticket stubs, there was no evidence on the daily net income, the routes plied by the bus and the average fares for each route. The submitted basis is too speculative and conjectural. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other evidence of profitability necessary to prove the amount of actual damages were presented. Thus, the Court a quo did not err in not awarding damages in favor of defendants-appellants.[64] We usually defer to the expertise of the CA, especially when it concurs with the factual findings of the RTC.[65] Indeed, findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by the Supreme Court in the following instances: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the lower court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions made without a citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (10) when the findings of fact of the lower court are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[66] However, the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions. We are in full accord with the CA that Spouses Yu failed to prove their counterclaim.
	GR NO. 156025 2007-01-31	FORMER MAYOR BRIGIDO R. SIMON v. FLORIDA R. MARTINEZ
Exemplary damages, which are awarded to set an example for the public good[63] and which are given in accordance to the sound discretion of the court,[64] are also warranted in this case.
	GR NO. 150157 2007-01-25	MAURICIO MANLICLIC v. MODESTO CALAUNAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.[38] Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[39] After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
	GR NO. 167071 2006-10-31	RUDY S. AMPELOQUIO v. ROMEO NAPIZA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Actions based upon a written contract should be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.[8] This accrual refers to the cause of action, which is defined as the act or the omission by which a party violates the right of another.[9] The period of prescription commences not from the date of the execution of the contract, but from the occurrence of the breach.[10] Prescription of actions, however, is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.[11] A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period.[12]
	GR NO. 153468 2006-08-17	PAUL LEE TAN v. PAUL SYCIP PANGANIBAN, CJ.
In the interest of substantial justice, this initial procedural lapse may be excused. [19] There appears to be no intention to circumvent the need for proper verification and certification, which are aimed at assuring the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the Petition for Review and at discouraging forum shopping.[20] More important, the substantial merits of petitioners' case and the purely legal question involved in the Petition should be considered special circumstances[21] or compelling reasons that justify an exception to the strict requirements of the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping.[22]
	GR NO. 144635 2006-06-26	PROGRAMME INCORPORATED v. PROVINCE OF BATAAN CORONA, J.
Time and again, we have ruled that factual matters are best evaluated by trial courts which can scrutinize evidence and hear testimony presented and offered by the parties (in this case, on the issue of ownership of the subject property). All the more does this principle ring true in this petition since such factual determination by the RTC was upheld by the CA.[9] Only questions of law are the proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, unless any of the known exceptions is extant in this case.[10] There is none.
	GR NO. 146726 2006-06-16	MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MAKATI TUSCANY CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION CALLEJO, SR., J.
In the more recent case of Naga Telephone Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[44] the Court made the following declaration: Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides, inter alia, that an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. Clearly, the ten (10) years period is to be reckoned from the time the right of action accrues which is not necessarily the date of execution of the contract. As correctly ruled by respondent court, private respondent's right of action arose "sometime during the latter part of 1982 or in 1983 when according to Atty. Luis General, Jr. x x x, he was asked by (private respondent's) Board of Directors to study said contract as it already appeared disadvantageous to (private respondent) (p. 31, tsn, May 8, 1989). Private respondent's cause of action to ask for reformation of said contract should thus be considered to have arisen only in 1982 or 1983, and from 1982 to January 2, 1989 when the complaint in this case was filed, ten (10) years had not yet elapsed.[45] This ruling was reiterated in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc., [46] where the Court declared that the cause of action of respondent therein arose upon its discovery of the short deliveries with certainty, since prior thereto, it had no indication that it was not getting what it was paying for. The Court declared that before then, there was yet no issue to speak of, and as such, respondent could not have brought an action against petitioner. It was stressed that "it was only after the discovery of the short deliveries that respondent got into position to bring an action for specific performance." Thus, the Court declared that the action was brought within the prescriptive period.[47]

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. JOHN BORDMAN LTD. OF ILOILO