This case has been cited 4 times or more.
2012-11-21 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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Ample jurisprudence provides that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules.[47] Indeed, "imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure are to be disregarded, except where substantial rights would otherwise be prejudiced."[48] Due to petitioners' subsequent and substantial compliance, we thus apply the rules liberally in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. | |||||
2009-01-19 |
NACHURA, J. |
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Similarly, the RTC is the proper venue to hear FUCC's prayer for permanent injunction. Unquestionably, RA No. 8975[16] enjoins all courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit or compel the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government. The proscription, however, covers only temporary restraining orders or writs but not decisions on the merits granting permanent injunction. Therefore, while courts below are prohibited by RA No. 8795 from issuing TROs or preliminary restraining orders pending the adjudication of the case, said statute, however, does not explicitly proscribe the issuance of a permanent injunction granted by a court of law arising from an adjudication of a case on the merits.[17] | |||||
2008-07-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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Similarly, in Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy,[46] we allowed the signature of only one of the principal parties in the case despite the absence of a Board Resolution which conferred upon him the authority to represent the petitioner BCDA. | |||||
2008-03-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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In Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy,[13] we held:Signature of a principal party sufficient for verification and certification |