Lawyerly

GR No. 214132

2015-02-18

SEALANES MARINE SERVICES v. ARNEL G. DELA TORRE

REYES, J.

In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[15] the Court ruled that it is of no consequence that the seafarer recovered from his illness or injury, for what is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days, and this constitutes total permanent disability: Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.[16] (Citations omitted and italics supplied)

GR No. 211454

2015-02-11

MAUNLAD TRANS. v. RODOLFO M. CAMORAL

REYES, J.

Thus, according to Kestrel, while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he must not be precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 days or 240 days, as is the case here, then he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.[24] In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[25] the Court specifically ruled that it is of no consequence that he recovered, for what is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days, and this constitutes permanent total disability: Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.[26] (Citations omitted and italics ours)

GR No. 195832

2014-10-01

FORMERLY INC SHIPMANAGEMENT v. BENJAMIN I. ROSALES

BRION, J.

In disability compensation, it is not the injury that is compensated; it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.[18]

GR No. 198367

2014-08-06

OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA v. JOSELITO B. PELLAZAR

BRION, J.

By recognizing that a disagreement between the company-designated physicians and the physician chosen by the seafarer may exist, the POEA-SEC itself impliedly recognizes the seafarer's right to request a second medical opinion from a physician of his own choice. That the seafarer should not be prevented from seeking an independent medical opinion proceeds from the theory that a company-designated physician, naturally, may downplay the compensation due to the seafarer because that is what the employer, after all, expects of him.[25] Accordingly, the Court observed that labor tribunals and the courts are not bound by the medical findings of the company-designated physician and that the inherent merits of its medical findings will be weighed and duly considered.[26]

GR No. 203472

2014-07-09

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. HENRY M. SIMBAJON

BRION, J.

Simbajon also claimed entitlement to a Grade I (120%) impediment rating[28] notwithstanding the Grade VI (50%) rating given to his disability by Dr. Vicaldo. Citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[29] he argued that his inability to work as a result of his illness lasted for more than 120 days.

GR No. 176652

2014-06-04

AUGUSTO C. SOLIMAN v. JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ

PEREZ, J.

On a final note, we emphasize that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.[32] This is in line with the time-honoured principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[33]

GR Nos. 194490-91

2013-03-20

TRANSOCEAN SHIP MANAGEMENT v. INOCENCIO B. VEDAD

VELASCO JR., J.

The POEA formulated the standard employment contract tor seafarers pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247, Series of 1995, to secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas.''[18] As in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, [19] an award of sickness allowance to Inocencio would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the seafarer in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.

GR No. 141508

2010-05-05

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO v. MANUEL LACSON

Verily, in numerous occasions, this Court has relaxed the rigid application of the rules to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time- honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[37] Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.[38] Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[39] In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. [40] For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[41] In the case at bar, considering that the same involves the various claims of 371 respondents, this Court finds that justice and equity are best served by allowing respondents to prove their case on the merits rather than denying them their day in court on a strict application of the rules.

GR No. 183329

2009-08-27

RUFINO C. MONTOYA v. TRANSMED MANILA CORPORATION

BRION, J.

the CA erred in not holding that petitioner is suffering from total and permanent disability following the ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc., A/S Stein Line Bergen v. Deo P. Natividad;[15]

GR No. 182426

2009-02-13

ZENAIDA POLANCO v. CARMEN CRUZ

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application.[26] Indeed, on several occasions, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of their cases. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[27]

GR No. 172800

2008-10-17

MARCIANO L. MASANGCAY v. TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In his Petition, Masangcay argued that since his "disability" lasted for more than 120 days, i.e., from 3 October 2002 until 3 February 2003, he is deemed to be already permanently disabled. Citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[38] Masangcay made a case that "in compensation proceedings, the fitness or unfitness of a seafarer should not be construed in its medical significance but rather on the inability of the seafarer to perform his customary work." In his case, he averred that "[t]here is no dispute that petitioner's illness was suffered during the term of his contract of employment and on board the respondents' vessel." And concludes that because of Sec. 20(b), paragraph 5 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, integrated in his contract of employment, "[h]e is this (sic) entitled to disability benefits x x x."

GR No. 172933

2008-10-06

JESUS E. VERGARA v. HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES

BRION, J.

The petitioner contends that the CA erred in denying him disability benefits contrary to existing jurisprudence, particularly the ruling of this Court in Crystal Shipping Inc., A/S Stein Line Bergen v. Deo P. Natividad,[13] and, in strictly interpreting the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA between the parties on the matter of who determines a seafarer's disability.

GR No. 173002

2008-07-04

BENJAMIN BAUTISTA v. SHIRLEY G. UNANGST

REYES, R.T., J.

Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as bases of decisions.[50] In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[51]

GR No. 161416

2008-06-13

MAUNLAD TRANSPORT

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[34] where the 1996 POEA-SEC was controlling, the Court upheld the medical report issued by the claimant's doctor of choice and disregarded that of the company-designated physician in view of the glaring apparent inconsistency in the latter's medical report between the classification of claimant's disability as Grade 9 and the fact stated that said claimant had been unable to work for three years, which condition makes his disability permanent and total.

GR NO. 159919

2007-08-08

COMPOSITE ENTERPRISES v. EMILIO M. CAPAROSO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Verily, litigation is not a game of technicalities. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.[25] Indeed, on numerous occasions, this Court has relaxed the rigid application of the rules to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[26] Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.[27] Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[28] In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.[29] For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[30]

GR NO. 159887

2006-04-12

BERNARDO REMIGIO v. NLRC

PUNO, J.

The same principles were cited in the more recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad.[44] In addition, the Court cited GSIS v. Cadiz[45] and Ijares v. CA[46] that "permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body."

GR NO. 165648

2006-03-26

EASTLAND CONSTRUCTION v. BENEDICTA MORTEL

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As required, the parties filed their respective memoranda.[17]

	GR No. 214132 2015-02-18	SEALANES MARINE SERVICES v. ARNEL G. DELA TORRE REYES, J.
In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[15] the Court ruled that it is of no consequence that the seafarer recovered from his illness or injury, for what is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days, and this constitutes total permanent disability: Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.[16] (Citations omitted and italics supplied)
	GR No. 211454 2015-02-11	MAUNLAD TRANS. v. RODOLFO M. CAMORAL REYES, J.
Thus, according to Kestrel, while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he must not be precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 days or 240 days, as is the case here, then he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.[24] In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[25] the Court specifically ruled that it is of no consequence that he recovered, for what is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days, and this constitutes permanent total disability: Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.[26] (Citations omitted and italics ours)
	GR No. 195832 2014-10-01	FORMERLY INC SHIPMANAGEMENT v. BENJAMIN I. ROSALES BRION, J.
In disability compensation, it is not the injury that is compensated; it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.[18]
	GR No. 198367 2014-08-06	OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA v. JOSELITO B. PELLAZAR BRION, J.
By recognizing that a disagreement between the company-designated physicians and the physician chosen by the seafarer may exist, the POEA-SEC itself impliedly recognizes the seafarer's right to request a second medical opinion from a physician of his own choice. That the seafarer should not be prevented from seeking an independent medical opinion proceeds from the theory that a company-designated physician, naturally, may downplay the compensation due to the seafarer because that is what the employer, after all, expects of him.[25] Accordingly, the Court observed that labor tribunals and the courts are not bound by the medical findings of the company-designated physician and that the inherent merits of its medical findings will be weighed and duly considered.[26]
	GR No. 203472 2014-07-09	MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. HENRY M. SIMBAJON BRION, J.
Simbajon also claimed entitlement to a Grade I (120%) impediment rating[28] notwithstanding the Grade VI (50%) rating given to his disability by Dr. Vicaldo. Citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[29] he argued that his inability to work as a result of his illness lasted for more than 120 days.
	GR No. 176652 2014-06-04	AUGUSTO C. SOLIMAN v. JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ PEREZ, J.
On a final note, we emphasize that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.[32] This is in line with the time-honoured principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[33]
	GR Nos. 194490-91 2013-03-20	TRANSOCEAN SHIP MANAGEMENT v. INOCENCIO B. VEDAD VELASCO JR., J.
The POEA formulated the standard employment contract tor seafarers pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247, Series of 1995, to secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas.''[18] As in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, [19] an award of sickness allowance to Inocencio would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the seafarer in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.
	GR No. 141508 2010-05-05	ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO v. MANUEL LACSON
Verily, in numerous occasions, this Court has relaxed the rigid application of the rules to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time- honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[37] Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.[38] Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[39] In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. [40] For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[41] In the case at bar, considering that the same involves the various claims of 371 respondents, this Court finds that justice and equity are best served by allowing respondents to prove their case on the merits rather than denying them their day in court on a strict application of the rules.
	GR No. 183329 2009-08-27	RUFINO C. MONTOYA v. TRANSMED MANILA CORPORATION BRION, J.
the CA erred in not holding that petitioner is suffering from total and permanent disability following the ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc., A/S Stein Line Bergen v. Deo P. Natividad;[15]
	GR No. 182426 2009-02-13	ZENAIDA POLANCO v. CARMEN CRUZ YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application.[26] Indeed, on several occasions, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of their cases. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[27]
	GR No. 172800 2008-10-17	MARCIANO L. MASANGCAY v. TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In his Petition, Masangcay argued that since his "disability" lasted for more than 120 days, i.e., from 3 October 2002 until 3 February 2003, he is deemed to be already permanently disabled. Citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[38] Masangcay made a case that "in compensation proceedings, the fitness or unfitness of a seafarer should not be construed in its medical significance but rather on the inability of the seafarer to perform his customary work." In his case, he averred that "[t]here is no dispute that petitioner's illness was suffered during the term of his contract of employment and on board the respondents' vessel." And concludes that because of Sec. 20(b), paragraph 5 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, integrated in his contract of employment, "[h]e is this (sic) entitled to disability benefits x x x."
	GR No. 172933 2008-10-06	JESUS E. VERGARA v. HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES BRION, J.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in denying him disability benefits contrary to existing jurisprudence, particularly the ruling of this Court in Crystal Shipping Inc., A/S Stein Line Bergen v. Deo P. Natividad,[13] and, in strictly interpreting the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA between the parties on the matter of who determines a seafarer's disability.
	GR No. 173002 2008-07-04	BENJAMIN BAUTISTA v. SHIRLEY G. UNANGST REYES, R.T., J.
Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as bases of decisions.[50] In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[51]
	GR No. 161416 2008-06-13	MAUNLAD TRANSPORT AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[34] where the 1996 POEA-SEC was controlling, the Court upheld the medical report issued by the claimant's doctor of choice and disregarded that of the company-designated physician in view of the glaring apparent inconsistency in the latter's medical report between the classification of claimant's disability as Grade 9 and the fact stated that said claimant had been unable to work for three years, which condition makes his disability permanent and total.
	GR NO. 159919 2007-08-08	COMPOSITE ENTERPRISES v. EMILIO M. CAPAROSO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Verily, litigation is not a game of technicalities. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.[25] Indeed, on numerous occasions, this Court has relaxed the rigid application of the rules to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[26] Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.[27] Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[28] In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.[29] For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[30]
	GR NO. 159887 2006-04-12	BERNARDO REMIGIO v. NLRC PUNO, J.
The same principles were cited in the more recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad.[44] In addition, the Court cited GSIS v. Cadiz[45] and Ijares v. CA[46] that "permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body."
	GR NO. 165648 2006-03-26	EASTLAND CONSTRUCTION v. BENEDICTA MORTEL CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As required, the parties filed their respective memoranda.[17]

CRYSTAL SHIPPING v. DEO P. NATIVIDAD