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SECRETARY EMILIA T. BONCODIN OF DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION

This case has been cited 11 times or more.

2013-06-03
BERSAMIN, J.
Pursuant to Article 100 of the Labor Code, petitioner as the employer could not reduce, diminish, discontinue or eliminate any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by or granted to its employees. This prohibition against the diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor full protection.[29] The application of the prohibition against the diminution of benefits presupposes that a company practice, policy or tradition favorable to the employees has been clearly established; and that the payments made by the employer pursuant to the practice, policy, or tradition have ripened into benefits enjoyed by them.[30] To be considered as a practice, policy or tradition, however, the giving of the benefits should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.[31] It is relevant to mention that we have not yet settled on the specific minimum number of years as the length of time sufficient to ripen the practice, policy or tradition into a benefit that the employer cannot unilaterally withdraw.[32]
2013-01-07
CARPIO, J.
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58[14] issues only upon a showing of the applicant's "clear legal right"[15] being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant.[16] "Clear legal right," within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right "clearly founded in or granted by law."[17] Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.[18] For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances.[19] These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against them.
2012-10-24
BERSAMIN, J.
We reiterate that injunction will not protect contingent, abstract or future rights whose existence is doubtful or disputed.[31]  Indeed, there must exist an actual right,[32]  because injunction will not be issued to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. At any rate, an application for injunctive relief is strictly construed against the pleader.[33]
2012-02-28
BRION, J.
While we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the discretion and rulemaking authority we are granted under the Constitution,[20] and set aside procedural considerations to permit parties to bring a suit before us at the first instance through certiorari and/or prohibition,[21] this liberal policy remains to be an exception to the general rule, and thus, has its limits.  In Concepcion v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),[22] we emphasized the importance of availing of the proper remedies and cautioned against the wrongful use of certiorari in order to assail the quasi-legislative acts of the COMELEC, especially by the wrong party.  In ruling that liberality and the transcendental doctrine cannot trump blatant disregard of procedural rules, and considering that the petitioner had other available remedies (such as a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate RTC under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court), as in this case, we categorically ruled: The petitioner's unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading Rule 65, given the way the petition was crafted.  Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve what the petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule 65.  It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of Court provide.  While we stop short of concluding that the petitioner's approaches constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative reading and application of the Rules of Court, we nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the Rules.  The transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly when remedial measures were available under these same rules to achieve the petitioner's objectives.  For our part, we cannot and should not in the name of liberality and the "transcendental importance" doctrine entertain these types of petitions. As we held in the very recent case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, albeit from a different perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused.[23] [emphasis supplied]
2011-09-14
MENDOZA, J.
Generally, employees have a vested right over existing benefits voluntarily granted to them by their employer, thus, said benefits cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the latter.[29] This principle against diminution of benefits, however, is applicable only if the grant or benefit is founded on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time which is consistent and deliberate.[30] It does not contemplate the continuous grant of unauthorized or irregular compensation but it presupposes that a company practice, policy and tradition favourable to the employees has been clearly established; and that the payments made by the company pursuant to it have ripened into benefits enjoyed by them.[31] The test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not covered by the law requiring payment thereof.[32] In sum, the benefit must be characterized by regularity, voluntary and deliberate intent of the employer to grant the benefits over a significant period of time.[33]
2010-02-01
DEL CASTILLO, J.
The requisites to justify an injunctive relief are: (1) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law." Absent any clear and unquestioned legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ would constitute grave abuse of discretion.[57] Caution and prudence must, at all times, attend the issuance of an injunctive writ because it effectively disposes of the main case without trial and/or due process.[58] In Olalia v. Hizon,[59] the Court held as follows: It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.
2009-07-23
VELASCO JR., J.
Thus, the Court has repeatedly held that, in order that an injunctive relief may be issued, the applicant must show that: "(1) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage."[30]
2009-01-20
PUNO, C.J.
Injunction, as a preservative remedy, aims to protect substantive rights and interests.[27] To be entitled to a writ of injunction, the complainant must establish the following requisites: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.[28] The grant of the writ is conditioned on the existence of the complainant's clear legal right, which means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law."[29]
2008-09-17
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Plaintiff's structure was one of those found existing during the census/survey of the area, and her structure was assigned TAG No. 77-0063. While it is true that NHA recognizes plaintiff as the censused owner of the structure built on the lot, the issuance of the tag number is not a guarantee for lot allocation. Plaintiff had petitioned the NHA for the award to her of the lot she is occupying. However, the census, tagging, and plaintiff's petition, did not vest upon her a legal title to the lot she was occupying, but a mere expectancy that the lot will be awarded to her. The expectancy did not ripen into a legal title when the NHA, through Ms. Ines Gonzales, sent a letter dated March 8, 1994 informing her that her petition for the award of the lot was denied. Moreover, the NHA, after the conduct of studies and consultation with residents, had designated Area 1, where the lot petitioned by plaintiff is located, as an Area Center.[8] A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and unconditional and no obstacle exists to its exercise. It is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon any contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a title -- legal or equitable -- to the present or future enjoyment of property.[9]
2007-10-15
CARPIO MORALES, J.
For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the plaintiff must be able to establish that (1) there is a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, (2) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[27]
2007-09-12
NACHURA, J.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act.  It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.[47]  As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the movant must show: (1) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) that the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.[48]  A "clear legal right" means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.[49]  The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the acts sought to be enjoined.  Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.[50]