This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2015-10-20 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In this jurisdiction, the concept of probation was introduced during the American colonial period.[14] For juvenile delinquents, Act No. 3203[15] was enacted on December 3, 1924. It was later amended by Act Nos. 3309,[16] 3559,[17] and 3725.[18] As to offenders who are eighteen years old and above, Act No. 4221[19] was passed by the legislature and took effect on August 7, 1935. Said Act allowed defendants who are convicted and sentenced by a Court of First Instance or by the Supreme Court on appeal, except those who are convicted of offenses enumerated in Section 8 thereof,[20] to be placed on probation upon application after the sentence has become final and before its service has begun.[21] However, We declared in People v. Vera[22] that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional and void as it constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards. | |||||
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2014-11-25 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Prior to the 2011 Desierto case came Our 2006 Resolution[19] in Romualdez v. Marcelo,[20] which involved a violation of Section 7 of RA 3019. In resolving the issue of whether or not the offenses charged in the said cases have already prescribed, We applied the same principle enunciated in Duque[21] and ruled that the prescriptive period for the offenses therein committed began to run from the discovery thereof on the day former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed the complaint with the PCGG. | |||||
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2012-06-26 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years.[16] Since the acts complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.[17] | |||||
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2012-06-26 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Meanwhile, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat in view of her death on January 2, 2004.[11] | |||||
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2009-04-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Indeed the Court in 2006 had the opportunity to favorably rule on the same issue of prescription on similar premises raised by the same respondent. In Romualdez v. Marcelo[8], as in this case, the original preliminary investigation was conducted by the PCGG, which then acted as complainant in the complaint filed with the Sandiganbayan. Given that it had been settled that such investigation and information filed by the PCGG was null and void, the Court proceeded to rule that "[i]n contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods." As explained by Justice Ynares-Santiago:Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case ofPeople v. Maravilla, this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican, this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription. | |||||
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2009-04-22 |
BRION, J. |
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| A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier "provisional" directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of double jeopardy,[22] by the previous extinction of criminal liability,[23] by the rule on speedy trial,[24] and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused.[25] Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional. | |||||
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2009-02-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The specification that Board members shall receive a per diem of not more than P5,000 for every meeting and the omission of a provision allowing Board members to receive other benefits lead the Court to the inference that Congress intended to limit the compensation of Board members to the per diem authorized by law and no other. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Had Congress intended to allow the Board members to receive other benefits, it would have expressly stated so.[33] For example, Congress' intention to allow Board members to receive other benefits besides the per diem authorized by law is expressly stated in Section 1 of RA No. 9286:[34] | |||||
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2008-02-27 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters.[51] The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[52] | |||||