This case has been cited 12 times or more.
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2013-06-10 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Questions of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve.[17] Only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA. Moreover, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.[18] Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the following NLRC factual findings are binding and conclusive on this Court: We noted that the individual quitclaims, waivers and releases executed by the complainants showing that they received their separation pay from MBMSI were duly notarized by a Notary Public. Such notarization gives prima facie evidence of their due execution. Further, said releases, waivers, and quitclaims were not refuted nor disputed by complainants herein, thus, we have no recourse but to uphold their due execution.[19] | |||||
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2012-10-24 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Questions of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve.[15] Only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA. Moreover, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.[16] | |||||
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2010-03-15 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Petitioner is fundamentally assailing the findings of both the Court of Appeals and the NLRC, that the evidence on record does not support his claim for disability benefits. This clearly involves a factual inquiry, the determination of which is not the statutory function of this Court. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in and resolved by this Court on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The reason being that the Court is not a trier of facts; it is not duty-bound to re-examine and calibrate the evidence on record. Moreover, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally conclusive on this Court.[23] | |||||
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2009-07-31 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of a specific job, work, or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or, service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal.[25] Under this arrangement, the following conditions must be met: (a) the contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of his work except as to the results thereof; (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investment; and (c) the agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees' entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social welfare benefits.[26] | |||||
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2009-07-23 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioner Nisda is fundamentally assailing the finding of both the Court of Appeals and the NLRC that the evidence on record does not support petitioner Nisda's entitlement to disability benefits. This clearly involves a factual inquiry, the determination of which is not the statutory function of this Court. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in and resolved by this Court on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. "The reason being that the Court is not a trier of facts; it is not duty-bound to re-examine and calibrate the evidence on record. Moreover, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the [Court of Appeals], are generally conclusive on this Court".[51] | |||||
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2008-11-20 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out with the contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal.[29] In this arrangement, the following conditions must be met: (a) the contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of his work except as to the results thereof; (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investment; and (c) the agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees' entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social welfare benefits.[30] | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting,[39] we elucidated in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission,[40] that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that may be considered include the following: whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and manner or terms of payment.[41] Simply put, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered.[42] Each case must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered.[43] | |||||
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2008-03-07 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. The first two paragraphs of Article 106 set the general rule that a principal is permitted by law to engage the services of a contractor for the performance of a particular job, but the principal, nevertheless, becomes solidarily liable with the contractor for the wages of the contractor's employees. The third paragraph of Article 106, however, empowers the Secretary of Labor to make distinctions between permissible job contracting and "labor-only" contracting, which is a prohibited act further defined under the last paragraph. A finding that a contractor is a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and the "labor-only" contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer.[25] | |||||
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2008-02-29 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| One who claims to be an independent contractor has to prove that he contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the employer's control except only as to the results.[28] | |||||
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2007-09-05 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in and resolved by this Court on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The reason being that the Court is not a trier of facts; it is not duty-bound to re-examine and calibrate the evidence on record. Moreover, findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.[21] In exceptional cases, however, we may be constrained to delve into and resolve factual issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties.[22] The present case is an exception to the rule. Hence, this Court finds the need to review the records to determine the facts with certainty not only because the NLRC and the labor arbiter have come up with conflicting positions but also because the findings of the NLRC, as supported by the CA on substantial matters, appear to be contrary to the evidence at hand. | |||||
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2007-08-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In fine, whether or not a commission forms part of the basic salary depends upon the circumstances or conditions for its payment, which indubitably are factual in nature for they will require a re-examination and calibration of the evidence on record. Thus, our review thereof in the case at bar would violate the settled rule that findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in due course, are conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts.[21] Nevertheless, should petitioner's commissions be considered in the computation of his retirement benefits and 13th month pay? | |||||
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2006-09-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT.[21] The issues that need to be resolved in this case are factual in nature - (1) whether or not Grigio is a "labor-only" contractor; and (2) whether the respondents were lawfully dismissed due to abandonment. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, this Court's review of decisions is confined to questions of law. Generally, the findings of fact made by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, as the specialized agencies presumed to have the expertise on matters within their respective fields, are accorded much respect and even finality, when supported by ample evidence.[22] However, when the findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC are contrary to the evidence on record, this Court shall lay aside such erroneous findings.[23] | |||||