This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2011-06-29 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| With the final settlement of the claims of petitioner against herein respondents, the issues raised in the present petition regarding the propriety of the issuance of writ of attachment by the trial court and the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the appellate court in reversing the orders of the trial court, have now become moot and academic. "A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."[13] In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.[14] | |||||
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2009-12-21 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan[20] is most apropos: To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and other cases, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive of the one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already declared to be final. The peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now. | |||||
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2009-09-10 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The doctrinal formulation may vary, but the bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the operations of its rules when the demands of justice so require.[45] Put a bit differently, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.[46] Accordingly, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.[47] This postulate on procedural technicalities applies to matters of locus standi and the presently invoked principle of hierarchy of courts, which discourages direct resort to the Court if the desired redress is within the competence of lower courts to grant. The policy on the hierarchy of courts, which petitioners indeed failed to observe, is not an iron-clad rule. For indeed the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons[48] or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.[49] | |||||