Lawyerly

GR No. 203655

2014-08-13

VELASCO JR., J.

Anent the above-quoted directives, emphasis must be given to the repeated use of the word "shall." It is elementary that the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the rule. It is a word of command, one which always has or must be given a compulsory meaning, and is generally imperative or mandatory.[32] Considering the compulsory tenor of the order, the rule could not be any clearer that once the negotiations at Stage Two shall have been successfully completed, it becomes mandatory for the GE to subject the JV activity to a competitive challenge. By the Guidelines' explicit order, proceeding to Stage Three of the process is compulsory, conditioned only on the successful conclusion of Stage Two. The GE is not given any discretion to decide whether it will proceed with the competitive challenge or not.

GR No. 184487

2013-02-27

MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN v. JOSEF ALBERT S. COMILANG

REYES, J.

The conclusive declaration in A.M. RTJ-10-2216 that Judge Belen's disobedience to the CA's injunctive writ constitutes indirect contempt of court cannot serve as a basis for the Court to be indifferent to or ignore the obvious violation of his right to be heard, state his defenses and explain his side. The power to punish for contempt is not limitless; it must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual.[18]

AM No. RTJ-09-2179

2012-09-24

PROSEC. JORGE D. BACULI v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN

VELASCO JR., J.

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.[34]

GR No. 187713

2012-08-01

RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK v. RUTH F. YAP

REYES, J.

Indirect contempt[58] refers to contumacious or stubbornly disobedient acts perpetrated outside of the court or tribunal and may include misbehaviour of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge; any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt; or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.[59] To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court or tribunal. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.[60]

AM No. RTJ-10-2216

2012-06-26

STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF ALBERT T. COMILANG v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN

PER CURIAM

Indirect contempt proceedings, therefore, may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court through an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt; or (2) by a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.[14] In the second instance, the verified petition for contempt shall be docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court in its discretion orders the contempt charge, which arose out of or related to the principal action, to be consolidated with the main action for joint hearing and decision.

GR No. 179488

2012-04-23

COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING v. KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY

PERALTA, J.

In Regalado v. Go,[30] the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy[31] doctrine to apply, thus: Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

GR No. 166858

2012-01-18

SOLEDAD TUCKER v. SPS. MANUEL P. OPPUS AND MARIA PAZ M. OPPUS

PERALTA, J.

It is an oft-repeated principle that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, if supported by evidence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.[21]

GR No. 170251

2011-06-01

CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA v. EMELITA BERNARDO

PERALTA, J.

In Regalado v. Go,[20] the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy[21] doctrine to apply, thus: Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

AM No. RTJ-07-2050

2008-10-29

SPS. ARLEEN AND LORNA OLIVEROS v. DIONISIO C. SISON

NACHURA, J.

Contempt of court is defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect, or to interfere with or prejudice parties-litigants or their witnesses during litigation. It is defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.[7]

GR No. 180557

2008-09-26

HEIRS OF ROQUE F. TABUENA v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES

YNARES-SATIAGO, J.

Moreover, laches has set in due to petitioners' inaction for more than 20 years to assail the due execution of the Deed of Assignment of Rights. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declines to assert it.[23] All the elements of laches are present in the instant case. The subject property was acquired by the government by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 which took effect on October 21, 1972; the parties executed the Deed of Assignment of Rights on October 10, 1979; but it was only on September 28, 2000 that petitioners filed the action for determination and payment of just compensation.

GR No. 147406

2008-07-14

VENANCIO FIGUEROA Y CERVANTES v. PEOPLE

NACHURA, J.

And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,[33] the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

GR No. 180643

2008-03-25

ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Ermita[20]is clear:When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is `in aid of legislation' under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

GR No. 177703

2008-01-28

VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANT RONALD G. ARRIOLA v. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado v. Go,[15] we held:As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory x x x:

	GR No. 203655 2014-08-13	SM LAND v. BASES CONVERSION VELASCO JR., J.
Anent the above-quoted directives, emphasis must be given to the repeated use of the word "shall." It is elementary that the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the rule. It is a word of command, one which always has or must be given a compulsory meaning, and is generally imperative or mandatory.[32] Considering the compulsory tenor of the order, the rule could not be any clearer that once the negotiations at Stage Two shall have been successfully completed, it becomes mandatory for the GE to subject the JV activity to a competitive challenge. By the Guidelines' explicit order, proceeding to Stage Three of the process is compulsory, conditioned only on the successful conclusion of Stage Two. The GE is not given any discretion to decide whether it will proceed with the competitive challenge or not.
	GR No. 184487 2013-02-27	MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN v. JOSEF ALBERT S. COMILANG REYES, J.
The conclusive declaration in A.M. RTJ-10-2216 that Judge Belen's disobedience to the CA's injunctive writ constitutes indirect contempt of court cannot serve as a basis for the Court to be indifferent to or ignore the obvious violation of his right to be heard, state his defenses and explain his side. The power to punish for contempt is not limitless; it must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual.[18]
	AM No. RTJ-09-2179 2012-09-24	PROSEC. JORGE D. BACULI v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN VELASCO JR., J.
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.[34]
	GR No. 187713 2012-08-01	RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK v. RUTH F. YAP REYES, J.
Indirect contempt[58] refers to contumacious or stubbornly disobedient acts perpetrated outside of the court or tribunal and may include misbehaviour of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge; any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt; or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.[59] To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court or tribunal. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.[60]
	AM No. RTJ-10-2216 2012-06-26	STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF ALBERT T. COMILANG v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN PER CURIAM
Indirect contempt proceedings, therefore, may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court through an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt; or (2) by a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.[14] In the second instance, the verified petition for contempt shall be docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court in its discretion orders the contempt charge, which arose out of or related to the principal action, to be consolidated with the main action for joint hearing and decision.
	GR No. 179488 2012-04-23	COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING v. KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY PERALTA, J.
In Regalado v. Go,[30] the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy[31] doctrine to apply, thus: Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
	GR No. 166858 2012-01-18	SOLEDAD TUCKER v. SPS. MANUEL P. OPPUS AND MARIA PAZ M. OPPUS PERALTA, J.
It is an oft-repeated principle that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, if supported by evidence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.[21]
	GR No. 170251 2011-06-01	CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA v. EMELITA BERNARDO PERALTA, J.
In Regalado v. Go,[20] the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy[21] doctrine to apply, thus: Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
	AM No. RTJ-07-2050 2008-10-29	SPS. ARLEEN AND LORNA OLIVEROS v. DIONISIO C. SISON NACHURA, J.
Contempt of court is defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect, or to interfere with or prejudice parties-litigants or their witnesses during litigation. It is defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.[7]
	GR No. 180557 2008-09-26	HEIRS OF ROQUE F. TABUENA v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
Moreover, laches has set in due to petitioners' inaction for more than 20 years to assail the due execution of the Deed of Assignment of Rights. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declines to assert it.[23] All the elements of laches are present in the instant case. The subject property was acquired by the government by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 which took effect on October 21, 1972; the parties executed the Deed of Assignment of Rights on October 10, 1979; but it was only on September 28, 2000 that petitioners filed the action for determination and payment of just compensation.
	GR No. 147406 2008-07-14	VENANCIO FIGUEROA Y CERVANTES v. PEOPLE NACHURA, J.
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,[33] the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
	GR No. 180643 2008-03-25	ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Ermita[20]is clear:When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is `in aid of legislation' under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
	GR No. 177703 2008-01-28	VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANT RONALD G. ARRIOLA v. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado v. Go,[15] we held:As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory x x x:

MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO v. ANTONIO S. GO