This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2009-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| On 22 February 2007, the Sandiganbayan ruled in TMEE's favor by granting its motion to dismiss. The Sandiganbayan, citing Philippine Free Press, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[5] found no credible reason why FPHC could not institute the complaint to annul the sale of the disputed shares of stock, simply for the alleged fear engendered by the Marcos rule since, in 1984 when the sale was consummated, martial rule was already lifted; and that, in the same year, protests against the then president were already mounting and boisterous. The Sandiganbayan opined that since FPHC's effort to recover the PCIB shares would have to be addressed by the court, the element of fear would have been neutralized since the judiciary did not lack gallant magistrates who refused to be cowed into silence by the dictator. The Sandiganbayan likewise found suspect FPHC's late pursuit of the recovery of the subject shares taking, in fact, two years after the late dictator was deposed. | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Here, from the time the questioned sale transaction on 24 May 1984 took place, FPHC did not deny that it had actual knowledge of the same. Simply, petitioner was fully aware of the sale of the PCIB shares to TMEE. Despite all this knowledge, petitioner did not question the said sale from its inception and some time thereafter. It was only after four years and seven months had lapsed following the knowledge or discovery of the alleged fraudulent sale that petitioner assailed the same. By then, it was too late for petitioner to beset the same transaction, since the prescriptive period had already come into play. As ruled in Philipppine Free Press, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[19] - | |||||
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2007-04-13 |
CORONA, J. |
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| It is axiomatic in statutory construction that we cannot read into the law something not intended by the legislature.[14] Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemus.[15] | |||||
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2007-02-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no qualification given by the same provision to limit its application to appeals from original resolutions and not to resolutions on reinvestigation. Hence, the rule stating that "when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish"[15] finds application in this regard. | |||||
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2006-09-08 |
CORONA, J. |
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| We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's stand that RA 7160, Section 391 (a)(7) applies only to multi- purpose halls accessible to the public in general and not to those which cater to an exclusive segment such as the homeowners or residents of a subdivision. Well-recognized is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts distinguish ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemus.[20] | |||||