This case has been cited 8 times or more.
|
2012-12-03 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field.[18] Nor do we substitute our "own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible."[19] The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.[20] | |||||
|
2011-10-19 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| The CA[73] erroneously applied Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent. Inc.[74] in ruling that petitioner is no longer entitled to claim disability benefits since he was declared fit to work by Dr. Cruz. The factual circumstances in Sarocam completely differ from the instant case. In Sarocam, the seafarer therein was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician after a lapse of only 13 days from the date of his repatriation[75] hence way before the lapse of the 120-day mark. Moreover, the seafarer therein executed a release and quitclaim in favor of his employers acknowledging receipt of his sickness benefits wages and freeing his employers of any liability.[76] | |||||
|
2010-03-22 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| We emphasize that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.[31] We should always be mindful that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.[32] | |||||
|
2008-11-14 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Again, in Benjamin L. Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc., and Demaco United Ltd,[9] the Court ruled that the opinion of the company-designated physician should be upheld over that of the doctors appointed by the seafarer considering that the basis of the findings of the seafarer's doctor are the medical findings of the company physician. | |||||
|
2008-06-13 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| In their Memorandum[22] and Supplemental Memorandum,[23] petitioners insist that the more binding interpretation on the provisions of the POEA-SEC was that rendered by the Court in German Marine, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission; [24] and, more recently, Rivera v. Wallem[25] and Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc.[26] -- which interpretation, petitioner claims, "support[s their] contention that under the pertinent POEA Contract applicable at the time respondent's cause of action accrued, it is only the company-designated physician who has the sole and exclusive right to determine and assess whether a seafarer is entitled to disability benefits or not."[27] To their mind, no other medical assessment of the claimant should be allowed, much less one rendered by a physician of the ECC, as said agency is without jurisdiction over disability claims filed under the POEA-SEC.[28] | |||||
|
2007-11-23 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| We completely agree. It is noted that petitioner took six months before disputing the finding of Dr. Cruz by filing a complaint for disability benefits. Worse, in his complaint, petitioner averred that he continued to undergo therapy and medication even after Dr. Cruz certified him fit to work.[39] Yet, petitioner did not secure from the doctors who administered such therapy and medication a certification that would contradict that of Dr. Cruz. Rather, he waited another month to manifest to the LA that he be examined by a government doctor. Such request is not reasonable. As we observed in Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent. Inc.,[40] it makes no sense to compare the certification of a company-designated physician with that of an employee-appointed physician if the former is dated seven to eight months earlier than the latter -- there would be no basis for comparison at all. | |||||
|
2007-09-11 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC,[17] cited by petitioner, is not applicable to this case. In that case, the Court allowed the payment of disability benefits representing reimbursement for medical expenses even if respondent's treatment was done by a physician not designated or accredited by petitioner. In that case, however, respondent initially sought the treatment of a company-accredited physician but he was refused admission at the hospital. Respondent had to seek medical assistance elsewhere because his life was at stake. In this case, petitioner was under the care of a company-designated physician. Petitioner only sought the intervention of another physician when Dr. Quiambao refused to assess his disability grade and after Dr. dela Cruz-de Leon issued the medical certification that he was fit to work. In Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc.,[18] the Court, citing German Marine Agencies v. NLRC,[19] ruled that it is the company-designated physician who should determine the degree of disability of a seaman or his fitness to work. The Court ruled that the only requirement stated in the POEA-SEC is that the doctor be company-designated, and no other. | |||||
|
2007-08-09 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
||||
| It must be stressed that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law must be raised.[7] The Court is not a trier of facts and is not to reassess the credibility and probative weight of the evidence of the parties and the findings and conclusions of the labor arbiter and the NLRC as affirmed by the appellate court. Moreover, the factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC are accorded respect and finality when supported by substantial evidence, which means such evidence as that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible.[8] | |||||