This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2009-09-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In the case of Ulep v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court made the following pronouncement: Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of fair play, justice and due process underlie the rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present evidence in contra to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.[22] | |||||
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2009-05-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Respondents had prior knowledge of the sale of the questioned portion to Agaton Pagaduan as the same deed of sale that conveyed the northern portion to them, conveyed the southern portion to Agaton Pagaduan.[15] Thus the subsequent issuance of TCT No. T-5425, to the extent that it affects the Pagaduan's portion, conferred no better right than the registration which was the source of the authority to issue the said title. Knowledge gained by respondents of the first sale defeats their rights even if they were first to register the second sale. Knowledge of the first sale blackens this prior registration with bad faith.[16] Good faith must concur with the registration.[17] Therefore, because the registration by the respondents was in bad faith, it amounted to no registration at all. | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court, because they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. [15] | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court because they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present evidence in contra to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.[10] To permit petitioner at this stage to change his theory would thus be unfair to respondent, and offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[11] | |||||
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2007-02-06 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Petitioner admits that the issue regarding the date of maturity of the loan which she incurred from the Poblete spouses was first brought up only in her Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CA. In an effort to clothe her argument with merit, petitioner contends that the CA should have properly considered this issue in the interest of justice and equity. The Court is not persuaded. It is settled that an issue not raised during trial could not be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[12] Contrary to petitioner's contention, it would be the height of injustice if the CA allowed her to raise an issue at a very late stage of the proceedings. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present evidence in contra to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.[13] It is true that this rule admits of exceptions as in cases of lack of jurisdiction, where the lower court committed plain error, where there are jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues raised present a matter of public policy.[14] However, the Court finds that none of these exceptions are present in the instant case. | |||||
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2006-12-05 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The general picture of this case readily shows the bad faith of the defendant-appellees' right from the very start when Manuel Vizarra unscrupulouslysub-divided and re-consolidated ownership of the property through various tax declarations together with the unexplained non-payment of real estate tax due thereon. Along with this, there is the RTC's finding that the defendants-appellants did not give the notice of the delinquency sale to the plaintiffs-appellees despite their knowledge that the property of the plaintiffs-appellees were about to be auctioned off. Finally, the fact that during the public auction sale, there was only one bidder, which by no coincidence happened to be Antonio Vizarra, there could be no clearer showing of defendants-appellants bad faith in purchasing the said property.[33] Good faith, or the lack of it, is, in the last analysis, a question of intention. But in ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated on a given occasion, courts are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which the inward may, with safety, be determined. So it is that "the honesty of intention," "the honest lawful intent," which constitutes good faith implies a "freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry."[34] | |||||
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2006-07-20 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Moreover, the similarity of signatures of Modesta and Concordia in the deed is not proof of forgery. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.[42] No standard or specimen signatures of Concordia and Modesta were offered to compare with the signatures appearing in the questioned deed of sale. Comparison of signatures cannot be made from two signatures appearing on the same document. | |||||