This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2012-01-18 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man's indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16[22], Rule 39 thereof specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent "separate action" to vindicate their claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property.[23] However, "a person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over the levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim".[24] | |||||
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2008-09-12 |
TINGA, J, |
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| On the other hand, there is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.[45] In the instant case, NAPOCOR is raising a question of law, that is, whether or not only an easement fee of 10% of the market value of the expropriated properties should be paid to the affected owners. This issue does not call for the reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence presented but rather the determination of whether the pertinent laws cited by NAPOCOR in support of its argument are applicable to the instant case. | |||||
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2008-07-09 |
CORONA, J. |
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| xxx xxx xxx We grant the petition only to the extent of allowing petitioners to adduce evidence in the trial court that TCT No. 15079 is in fact their family home as constituted in accordance with the requirements of law. This is in consonance with our ruling in Gomez v. Sta. Ines[10] where we held:[The husband and children] were not parties to the Pasig RTC case and are third-party claimants who became such only after trial in the previous case had been terminated and the judgment therein had become final and executory. Neither were they indispensable nor necessary parties in the Pasig RTC case, and they could not therefore intervene in said case. As strangers to the original case, respondents cannot be compelled to present their claim with the Pasig RTC which issued the writ of execution.xxx In said case, the alleged family home was sold on execution by the sheriff of the Pasig RTC. The husband and children of the judgment debtor filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the levied property in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya where the alleged family home was situated. As they were considered strangers to the action filed in the Pasig RTC, we ruled that the Nueva Vizcaya RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint and that they could vindicate their alleged claim to the levied property there.[11] | |||||