This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2010-08-25 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners' argument that their VLTs were intrinsically ambiguous and failed to express their true intention by asking why petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their contract.[46] A cause of action for the reformation of a contract only arises when one of the contracting parties manifests an intention, by overt acts, not to abide by the true agreement of the parties.[47] It seems fairly obvious that petitioners had no cause to reform their VLTs because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners) never had any dispute as to the interpretation and application thereof. They both understood the VLTs to cover the Murong property (and not the Lantap property). It was only much later, when strangers to the contracts argued for a different interpretation, that the issue became relevant for the first time. | |||||
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2009-11-20 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It must be observed that this is the very first time at this very late stage that SEM has presented the quarterly exploration reports. From the early phase of this controversy, SEM did not disprove the arguments of the other parties that Marcopper violated the terms under EP 133, among other violations, by not complying with the mandatory exploration work program. Neither did it present evidence for the appreciation of the lower tribunals. Hence, the non-compliance with the mandatory exploration work program was not made an issue in any stage of the proceedings. The rule is that an issue that was not raised in the lower court or tribunal cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as this would violate the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[51] Thus, this Court cannot take cognizance of the issue of whether or not MMC complied with the mandatory work program. | |||||
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2007-10-05 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| (3) Upon a judgment. In Multi-Realty Development Corporation v. The Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation,[5] we held that the term "right of action" is the right to commence and maintain an action. The right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred. | |||||
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2007-04-24 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Lastly, we note that petitioner is raising the issue of prescription for the first time in the instant motion for reconsideration. Although the same was raised in the petition for review, it was dismissed for late filing. No motion for reconsideration was filed hence the disputed assessment became final, demandable and executory. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for relief from judgment. However, it failed to raise the issue of prescription therein. After its petition for relief from judgment was denied by the Court of Tax Appeals for lack of merit, petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court without raising the issue of prescription. It is only in the instant motion for reconsideration that petitioner raised the issue of prescription which is not allowed. The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,[8] much more in a motion for reconsideration as in this case, because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[9] This last ditch effort to shift to a new theory and raise a new matter in the hope of a favorable result is a pernicious practice that has consistently been rejected. | |||||