This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2011-09-14 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Indeed, a second MR as a rule, is generally a prohibited pleading.[24] The Court, however, does not discount instances when it may authorize the suspension of the rules of procedure so as to allow the resolution of a second motion for reconsideration, in cases of extraordinarily persuasive reasons[25] such as when the decision is a patent nullity.[26] | |||||
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2011-03-22 |
BRION, J. |
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| In Alcantara v. Ponce,[29] the Court, instead of citing the respondent Atty. Escareal-Sandejas for contempt, chose to reprimand her (and warned her that her commission of the same act would be more drastically dealt with) noting her apparent inexperience in practice of the profession, especially in appellate proceedings before the Court. Similarly, in Racines v. Judge Morallos,[30] the Court, after finding Jaime Racines guilty of indirect contempt, merely reprimanded him because "he is not learned in the intricacies of the law." | |||||
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2009-12-21 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action.[25] | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The Court re-emphasizes the doctrine of finality of judgment. In Alcantara v. Ponce,[36] the Court, citing its much earlier ruling in Arnedo v. Llorente,[37] stressed the importance of said doctrine, to wit: It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that courts should decide all questions submitted to them "as truth and justice require," and that it is greatly to be desired that all judgments should be so decided; but controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. With the full knowledge that courts are not infallible, the litigants submit their respective claims for judgment, and they have a right at some time or other to have final judgment on which they can rely as a final disposition of the issue submitted, and to know that there is an end to the litigation.[38] | |||||
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2008-07-21 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The Court re-emphasizes the doctrine of finality of judgment. In Alcantara v. Ponce,[7] the Court, citing its much earlier ruling in Arnedo v. Llorente,[8] stressed the importance of said doctrine, to wit:It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that courts should decide all questions submitted to them "as truth and justice require," and that it is greatly to be desired that all judgments should be so decided; but controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. With the full knowledge that courts are not infallible, the litigants submit their respective claims for judgment, and they have a right at some time or other to have final judgment on which they can rely as a final disposition of the issue submitted, and to know that there is an end to the litigation.[9] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2008-02-04 |
TINGA, J, |
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| On various occasions,[21] the Court has ruled on the primacy of special laws and of their implementing regulations over the Administrative Code of 1987 in settling controversies specifically subject of these special laws. For instance, in Hon. Joson v. Exec. Sec. Torres,[22] the Court held that the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 (A.O. No. 23)[23] govern administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials, whereas the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character to all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23.[24] The aforesaid ruling is based on the principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes applicable to a particular case, that which is specially intended for the said case must prevail.[25] | |||||
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2006-11-20 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In Alcantara v. Ponce,[26] this Court found the incessant filing by the respondents and their counsels of pleadings and motions with the ultimate purpose of convincing the Court to give due course to their petition despite its categorical and final resolve to deny the same as constituting indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P2,000.00 each. | |||||