This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2011-08-31 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| It bears stressing that payment of docket and other fees within this period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. The payment of appellate docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory as if no appeal was filed.[16] | |||||
|
2009-08-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| At any rate, the plea for a liberal application of technical rules of procedure to promote the ends of justice is undeserving of any sympathy from us. Time and again, we have ruled that the payment of the full amount of docket fee within the period to appeal is a sine qua non requirement for the perfection of an appeal.[22] Such payment is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory, as if no appeal was filed. [23] Moreover, as we observed in Lazaro v. Court of Appeals: [24] | |||||
|
2009-07-31 |
PUNO, C.J. |
||||
| It is a well-established rule that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.[18] Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision or final order sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[19] The payment of docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.[20] | |||||
|
2009-06-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| In this case, there was no material alteration of the judgment. The amendment merely consisted of changing the word "defendant" with "plaintiff" in the dispositive portion, and it is obvious that it was "plaintiff" (herein respondent) who filed the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the prescriptive period for filing the petition for review with the CA should be counted from the date respondent received a copy of the first judgment denying his motion for reconsideration, which was on April 18, 2001. Respondent had until May 3, 2001 to file a petition for review, but he filed a motion for extension to file the petition only on November 27, 2001, or almost seven months later. In one case, the Court declared that a delay of almost seven months is far from reasonable.[29] | |||||