This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-09-09 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter's sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.[36] The latter's bare allegations of Judge Madrid's partiality or hostility did not suffice,[37] because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.[38] As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra. | |||||
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2010-09-01 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Further, in a motion for inhibition, "[t]he movant must x x x prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial."[14] "Bare allegations of partiality x x x [is not sufficient] in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor."[15] Petitioner's bare allegations in his motion to inhibit are not adequate grounds for the disqualification or inhibition of the trial judge. Thus, credence should not be given to the issue of alleged prejudice and partiality of the trial judge. | |||||
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2008-09-11 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,[20] as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her.[21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. | |||||
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2007-07-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This Court has ruled that to disqualify or not to disqualify is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the sense of fairness and justice of the judge concerned.[56] Said discretion is granted to judges, since they are in the better position to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties in their courtrooms.[57] The test that must be applied in questions involving the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial.[58] In this case, we hold that petitioner was not deprived of her day in court, for she was able to file her comments on and/or objections to the motions filed by private respondent. She, therefore, was able to ventilate her positions on the issues brought before the trial court. | |||||