This case has been cited 4 times or more.
2010-05-04 |
PERALTA, J. |
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It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal's exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.[4] Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty.[5] | |||||
2010-03-09 |
PERALTA, J. |
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It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal. Absent such grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal's exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.[5] Grave abuse of discretion has been defined in Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal[6] as follows: Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[7] | |||||
2010-01-11 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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We held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[27] The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.[28] Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[29] Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. | |||||
2009-07-21 |
CORONA, J. |
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The only prerequisite to the exercise by the HRET of its prerogative under Rule 88 was its own determination that the evidence thus far presented could affect the officially proclaimed results. Much like the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, the determination of whether the evidence could influence the officially proclaimed results was a highly technical undertaking, a function best left to the specialized expertise of the HRET. In Abubakar v. HRET,[46] this Court declined to review the ruling of the HRET on a matter that was discretionary and technical. The same sense of respect for and deference to the constitutional mandate of the HRET should now animate the Court in resolving this case. |