Lawyerly

GR No. 160444

2012-08-29

WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES v. ERNESTO C. TANAWAN

BERSAMIN, J.

That the company-designated physician did not render any finding of disability is of no consequence. Disability should be understood more on the loss of earning capacity rather than on the medical significance of the disability.[36] Even in the absence of an official finding by the company- designated physician to the effect that the seafarer suffers a disability and is unfit for sea duty, the seafarer may still be declared to be suffering from a permanent disability if he is unable to work for more than 120 days.[37] What clearly determines the seafarer's entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days.[38] Although the company- designated physician already declared the seafarer fit to work, the seafarer's disability is still considered permanent and total if such declaration is made belatedly (that is, more than 120 days after repatriation).[39]

GR No. 177578

2012-01-25

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. OBERTO S. LOBUSTA

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Petitioners are mistaken that it is only the POEA Standard Employment Contract that must be considered in determining Lobusta's disability. In Palisoc v. Easways Marine, Inc.,[25] we said that whether the Labor Code's provision on permanent total disability applies to seafarers is already a settled matter. In Palisoc, we cited the earlier case of Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission[26] where we said (1) that the standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247[27] "to secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith," and "to promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas"; (2) that Section 29 of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract itself provides that all rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory; and (3) that even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the Civil Code expressly subjects it to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.[28] In affirming the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability, Remigio further stated: Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, seaman Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by the company-accredited physician. The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico, GSIS v. CA, and Bejerano v. ECC that "disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness." It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC, that in a disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.

GR No. 186289

2010-06-29

ORIENTAL SHIPMANAGEMENT CO. v. ROMY B. BASTOL

VELASCO JR., J.

Second, relying on and applying the principles enunciated in Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission[38] together with the application of Sec. 20 in relation to Secs. 30 and 30-A of the SEC, the appellate court appreciated and found total and permanent disability of Bastol, considering the undisputed fact that he could not pursue his usual work as a seaman for a period of more than 120 days. Moreover, it noted that no less than four doctors--Dr. Peralta, Dr. Lim, Dr. Varwig and Dr. Vicaldo--found Bastol to be suffering from a heart ailment which prevented him from being employed at his usual job as a seafarer or seaman.

GR No. 182430

2009-12-04

LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. KJGS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA

CARPIO MORALES, J.

The claim for attorney's fees is granted following Article 2208 of the New Civil Code which allows its recovery in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under the employer's liability laws. The same fees are also recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest[17] as in the present case following the refusal by respondent to settle his claims. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the monetary award.

GR No. 163838

2008-09-25

WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The more accurate view of Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC is that espoused by respondent. In his Comment[27] and Memorandum,[28] respondent cited Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission[29] in which the Court referred to the definition of permanent disability under the Labor Code to interpret Section 20-B(3), thus:The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas." Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the] Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."

GR No. 155034

2008-05-22

VIRGILIO SAPIO v. UNDALOC CONSTRUCTION

TINGA, J,

The award of attorney's fees is warranted under the circumstances of this case. Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney's fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer's liability laws[36] but shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded.[37] The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party.

GR No. 158073

2007-11-23

ALEX M. CADORNIGARA v. NLRC

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Second, any of the three kinds of disability benefits granted under the Labor Code, as implemented by Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V.[28] Petitioner has been paid sickness allowance.[29] The question is whether he should also be paid disability benefits.

GR NO. 152273

2007-09-11

MARS C. PALISOC v. EASWAYS MARINE

CARPIO, J.

x x x x In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[11] petitioner, a seafarer, applied for permanent total disability under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Section 30 of the 1996 POEA-SEC did not provide for the payment of compensation benefits for cardiac catheterization or heart bypass. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals also ruled that heart ailment was not included among the compensable sickness and injuries under the 1996 POEA-SEC.

GR NO. 162419

2007-07-10

PAUL V. SANTIAGO v. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT

TINGA, J.

The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply stated, the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.[30] The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees in the concept of damages and expenses of litigation. Attorney's fees are recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.[31] We note that respondent's basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed. Time and again, this Court has upheld management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.[32] Respondent's failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing petitioner to institute the suit below. The award of attorney's fees is thus warranted.

GR NO. 156573

2007-06-19

MICRONESIA RESOURCES v. FABIOLO CANTOMAYOR

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of his employment caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. We have interpreted the foregoing provision to be a sufficient legal basis for a grant of disability benefits to a seafarer who suffers any injury or illness during the term of his contract. In the recent case of Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[19] we held:"Disability" is generally defined as "loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury or sickness." Clearly, "disability" is not synonymous with "sickness" or "illness," the former being a potential effect of the latter. The schedule in Sec. 30 of the POEA SEC is a Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted. It is not a list of compensable sicknesses. Unlike the 2000 POEA SEC, nowhere in the 1996 POEA SEC is there a list of "Occupational Diseases."

	GR No. 160444 2012-08-29	WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES v. ERNESTO C. TANAWAN BERSAMIN, J.
That the company-designated physician did not render any finding of disability is of no consequence. Disability should be understood more on the loss of earning capacity rather than on the medical significance of the disability.[36] Even in the absence of an official finding by the company- designated physician to the effect that the seafarer suffers a disability and is unfit for sea duty, the seafarer may still be declared to be suffering from a permanent disability if he is unable to work for more than 120 days.[37] What clearly determines the seafarer's entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days.[38] Although the company- designated physician already declared the seafarer fit to work, the seafarer's disability is still considered permanent and total if such declaration is made belatedly (that is, more than 120 days after repatriation).[39]
	GR No. 177578 2012-01-25	MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. OBERTO S. LOBUSTA VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Petitioners are mistaken that it is only the POEA Standard Employment Contract that must be considered in determining Lobusta's disability. In Palisoc v. Easways Marine, Inc.,[25] we said that whether the Labor Code's provision on permanent total disability applies to seafarers is already a settled matter. In Palisoc, we cited the earlier case of Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission[26] where we said (1) that the standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247[27] "to secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith," and "to promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas"; (2) that Section 29 of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract itself provides that all rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory; and (3) that even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the Civil Code expressly subjects it to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.[28] In affirming the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability, Remigio further stated: Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, seaman Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by the company-accredited physician. The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico, GSIS v. CA, and Bejerano v. ECC that "disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness." It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC, that in a disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
	GR No. 186289 2010-06-29	ORIENTAL SHIPMANAGEMENT CO. v. ROMY B. BASTOL VELASCO JR., J.
Second, relying on and applying the principles enunciated in Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission[38] together with the application of Sec. 20 in relation to Secs. 30 and 30-A of the SEC, the appellate court appreciated and found total and permanent disability of Bastol, considering the undisputed fact that he could not pursue his usual work as a seaman for a period of more than 120 days. Moreover, it noted that no less than four doctors--Dr. Peralta, Dr. Lim, Dr. Varwig and Dr. Vicaldo--found Bastol to be suffering from a heart ailment which prevented him from being employed at his usual job as a seafarer or seaman.
	GR No. 182430 2009-12-04	LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. KJGS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA CARPIO MORALES, J.
The claim for attorney's fees is granted following Article 2208 of the New Civil Code which allows its recovery in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under the employer's liability laws. The same fees are also recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest[17] as in the present case following the refusal by respondent to settle his claims. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the monetary award.
	GR No. 163838 2008-09-25	WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The more accurate view of Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC is that espoused by respondent. In his Comment[27] and Memorandum,[28] respondent cited Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission[29] in which the Court referred to the definition of permanent disability under the Labor Code to interpret Section 20-B(3), thus:The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas." Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the] Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."
	GR No. 155034 2008-05-22	VIRGILIO SAPIO v. UNDALOC CONSTRUCTION TINGA, J,
The award of attorney's fees is warranted under the circumstances of this case. Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney's fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer's liability laws[36] but shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded.[37] The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party.
	GR No. 158073 2007-11-23	ALEX M. CADORNIGARA v. NLRC AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Second, any of the three kinds of disability benefits granted under the Labor Code, as implemented by Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V.[28] Petitioner has been paid sickness allowance.[29] The question is whether he should also be paid disability benefits.
	GR NO. 152273 2007-09-11	MARS C. PALISOC v. EASWAYS MARINE CARPIO, J.
x x x x In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[11] petitioner, a seafarer, applied for permanent total disability under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Section 30 of the 1996 POEA-SEC did not provide for the payment of compensation benefits for cardiac catheterization or heart bypass. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals also ruled that heart ailment was not included among the compensable sickness and injuries under the 1996 POEA-SEC.
	GR NO. 162419 2007-07-10	PAUL V. SANTIAGO v. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT TINGA, J.
The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply stated, the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.[30] The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees in the concept of damages and expenses of litigation. Attorney's fees are recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.[31] We note that respondent's basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed. Time and again, this Court has upheld management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.[32] Respondent's failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing petitioner to institute the suit below. The award of attorney's fees is thus warranted.
	GR NO. 156573 2007-06-19	MICRONESIA RESOURCES v. FABIOLO CANTOMAYOR AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of his employment caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. We have interpreted the foregoing provision to be a sufficient legal basis for a grant of disability benefits to a seafarer who suffers any injury or illness during the term of his contract. In the recent case of Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[19] we held:"Disability" is generally defined as "loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury or sickness." Clearly, "disability" is not synonymous with "sickness" or "illness," the former being a potential effect of the latter. The schedule in Sec. 30 of the POEA SEC is a Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted. It is not a list of compensable sicknesses. Unlike the 2000 POEA SEC, nowhere in the 1996 POEA SEC is there a list of "Occupational Diseases."

BERNARDO REMIGIO v. NLRC