This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2014-04-21 |
ABAD, J. |
||||
| It is pointed out that under common law,[23] if one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to another corporation, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the transferor if it has acted in good faith and has paid adequate consideration for the assets, except: (1) where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2) where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the corporations; (3) where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; and (4) where the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts.[24] | |||||
|
2009-09-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| Due to petitioner's resort to an improper remedy, the filing of the petition before the CA did not toll the reglementary period for filing an appeal with the DARAB.[39] As such, the decision of the PARAD should ordinarily be considered as final and executory. But the Court need not rub it in all the more by depriving petitioner of any remedy. The nature of the issues raised by petitioner before the PARAD--such as, but not limited to, the irregularity in the initial acquisition proceedings, the undue haste in the issuance of the TCT-CLOAs, and the consequent cloud that hangs over the CLOAs in question--needs to be addressed. The PARAD no less admitted that the entries and annotations made in the CLOAs were erroneous and adverse to the interest of petitioner, who it seems has yet to receive just compensation for her two parcels of land. The inequity of barring petitioner from vindicating her right is rendered more acute in the face of the undisputed fact that the DAR has taken her property for CARP purposes ostensibly with their agents in the field not hewing strictly with the requirements of the law and whose negligence tainted the CLOAs thus issued. The purpose behind the passage of the CARP law would not be compromised should petitioner be allowed to pursue her case before the right forum. With this in mind, we remand the instant case to the DARAB for proper disposition of the issues raised by petitioner. | |||||
|
2009-06-30 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| Largely for the same reason and as discussed below, we are not inclined to suspend the rules to come to the rescue of a litigant whose counsel has blundered by reading the wrong applicable provision. The Rules of Court are with us for the prompt and orderly administration of justice; litigants cannot, after resorting to a wrong remedy, simply cry for the liberal construction of these rules.[12] Our ruling in Lapid v. Laurea[13] succinctly emphasized this point when we said:Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and, thus, effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. [Emphasis supplied.] | |||||