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OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. PENDATUN G. LAJA

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 181760 2014-10-14	ATTY. ANACLETO B. BUENA v. DR. SANGCAD D. BENITO LEONEN, J.
Nevertheless, considering the important question before us, we take cognizance of the petition and resolve the case on the merits.[58]
	GR No. 178343 2014-07-14	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. ALEX M. VALENCERINA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Fourth, the previous ruling in Lapid v. CA[58] (as quoted in Lopez v. CA[59] and OMB v. Laja[60]) wherein the Court, relying on the old OMB Rules of Procedure, i.e., Administrative Order No. 7 dated April 10, 1990, had opined that "the fact that the [Ombudsman Act] gives parties the right to appeal from [the OMB's] decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal,"[61] cannot be successfully invoked by Valencerina in this case for the reason that the said pronouncement had already been superseded by the more recent ruling in Buencamino v. CA[62] (Buencamino). In Buencamino, the Court applied the current OMB Rules of Procedure, i.e., Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, which were already in effect at the time the CA assailed Resolutions dated June 15, 2006 and April 24, 2007 were issued, and, hence, governing. The pertinent portions of the Buencamino ruling are hereunder quoted for ready reference: In interpreting the above provision, this Court held in Laja, citing Lopez that "only orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalties of public censure, reprimand or suspension of not more than one month or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory."
	GR No. 165132 2012-03-07	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. NELLIE R. APOLONIO BRION, J.
We affirmed and consistently applied this ruling in the cases of Gemma P. Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII,[41] Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[42] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[43] Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,[44] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[45] Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero,[46] and Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.[47]
	GR No. 166495 2011-02-16	ROQUE C. FACURA v. CA MENDOZA, J.
The CA, however, cannot be blamed for so ruling because at that time the Court's rulings were not definite and, thus, nebulous. There were no clear-cut guidelines yet. Even the initial ruling in Samaniego on September 11, 2008, stated in effect that the mere filing by a respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the execution of the joint decision against him. The Samaniego initial ruling merely followed that in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,[42] where it was stated: [O]nly orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory.In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right.The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. [Emphasis in the original].
	GR No. 185132 2009-04-24	GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA v. CA 12TH DIVISION NACHURA, J.
Without further belaboring the point, we find it very clear that the extreme urgency of the situation required an equally urgent resolution, and due to the public interest involved, the petitioners are justified in straightforwardly seeking the intervention of this Court. Again, as we repeatedly held in prior cases, the provisions of the Rules should be applied with reason and liberality to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[31]
	GR No. 175460 2008-04-14	METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION v. PIGLAS NFWU-KMU CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.[11] Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[12] The rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption that the court or administrative body which issued the assailed order or resolution may amend the same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error.[13]
	GR NO. 175895 2007-04-12	EDMUNDO JOSE T. BUENCAMINO v. CA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Petitioner alleged therein that in denying his application for a preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion; that pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07,[2] the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman suspending him from office is not immediately executory; and that in enforcing its Decision suspending him from the service during the pendency of his appeal, the Office of the Ombudsman violated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and the rulings of this Court in Lapid v. Court of Appeals;[3] Lopez v. Court of Appeals,[4] and Ombudsman v. Laja.[5]