This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-06-04 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse.[6]Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial.[7]In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[8] this Court held: In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein. | |||||
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2010-07-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran[99] (Portugal case), the Court recognized that there are instances when a declaration of heirship need not be made in a separate special proceeding: The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.[100] | |||||
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2009-03-13 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[18] where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| Petitioners' fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari'a District Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding.[54] The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.[55] In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent. | |||||
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2008-11-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[49] where we scrutinized our rulings in Heirs of Yaptinchay and the cited cases of Litam v. | |||||
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2008-04-10 |
PUNO, CJ. |
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| In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,[18] or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,[19] this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding." [20] In the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[21] the Court had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.[22] In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the "Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario[23] is applicable in the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners' predecessor and by virtue of succession have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled: | |||||
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2006-04-26 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Furthermore, we agree with the petitioners' undisputed contention that when the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the title over the subject lot was still in the name of Adelina Gurrea and that it was only on October 7, 1980 that the title was transferred in the name of Ricardo. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.[20] The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.[21] In the present case, while the subject lot was assigned as Ricardo's share in the project of partition executed by the heirs of Adelina Gurrea, the title over the subject lot was still in the name of the latter and was not yet conveyed to Ricardo when the Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed. As correctly cited by petitioners, the Court held in Lucero v. Bañaga[22] that: [t]he term "delivery" or tradition has two aspects: (1) the de jure delivery or the execution of deeds of conveyance and (2) the delivery of the material possession (Florendo vs. Foz, 20 Phil. 388, 393). The usual practice is that, if the land to be delivered is in the name of the decedent, the administrator executes a deed, conveying the land to the distributee. That deed, together with the project of partition, the order approving it, the letters of administration and the certification as to the payment of the estate, inheritance and realty taxes, is registered in the corresponding Registry of Deeds. Title would then be issued to the distributee. Thereafter, the administrator or executor places him in material possession of the land if the same is in the custody of the former.[23] | |||||