This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-07-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In the same vein, petitioners are clutching at straws in impressing upon this Court that petitioner Bravo, in signing the Indemnity Agreement in his personal capacity, has already bound himself to be jointly and severally liable with Mapfre for the monetary award and this has the effect of securing the bond. Suffice it to say that "[t]he obvious purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed."[42] To the Court's mind, the intention in requiring a security deposit or collateral to secure the bond, apart from the indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and the bonding company, is to further ensure recovery by the employee of the judgment award should the same be affirmed, in any and all eventualities. This is also in keeping with the purpose of the bond requirement which is to "discourage employers from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employee's possible just and lawful claims."[43] Besides, it is an ail-too familiar rule in statutory construction that when a rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to.[44] Since Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure requires that a surety bond should be accompanied by both an indemnity agreement and proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond, among others, that two must be presented. The submission of one cannot be considered sufficient as to dispense with the other. No resort to any interpretation is necessary, there is only room for application.[45] | |||||
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2010-10-06 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Further, respondent, citing Adasa v. Abalos,[16] argues that the DOJ "muddled" the distinction between Sections 7 and 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal and that an "outright" dismissal is not allowed since the DOJ must set the reasons why it finds no reversible error[17] in an assailed resolution. | |||||
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2008-09-12 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| It is well to note at this point that the Court, in this petition for review on certiorari, cannot review the evidence adduced by the parties before the prosecutor on the issue of the absence or presence of probable cause.[16] Respect must be accorded to the trial court's disposition of the motion to withdraw absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion. | |||||
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2007-07-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Nothing in the records discloses that petitioner's arraignment was with restriction, condition, or reservation. Jurisprudence is clear that with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because petitioner had already waived or abandoned the same.[55] In the case at bar, following petitioner's arraignment, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his petition for review earlier filed with the DOJ Secretary. | |||||